William Sebastian Cohen rođen je u Maineu 28. avgusta 1940. Diplomirao je na Pravnom fakultetu Univerziteta u Bostonu 1962. godine i počeo raditi kao advokat u Bangoru.
Cohen je predavao pravo na Univerzitetu Maine (1968-1972). Član Republikanske stranke, Cohen je bio gradonačelnik Bangora (1971-1972) i izabran je za 93. kongres. Ponovo je izabran u 94. i 95. kongres prije nego što je izabran u Senat 1978.
1985. Cohen i Gary Hart, drugi član obavještajnog odbora Senata, objavili su roman Double Man. Prema Bob Woodward -u: "Ovo je stručno izrađen triler prepun mnogih neugodnih uvjerljivosti. Iako je jasno označen kao fikcija, znano pleše sa mnogim starim i novim duhovima, uključujući CIA -u, KGB -u, Kennedyjevo ubistvo, terorizam i niz državnih tajni. Dvostruki čovek mora se uzeti minimalno kao mračno upozorenje o obavještajnim službama u našoj zemlji i drugdje. "
Ostale Cohenove knjige uključuju Ljudi revnosti: Iskrena unutarnja priča o saslušanjima protiv Irana (1988), Jednooki kraljevi (1991), Ubistvo u Senatu (1993) i Laki plijen: bježanje starijih američkih građana (1997).
William S. Cohen napustio je Senat 1996. Sljedeće godine služio je kao ministar odbrane u kabinetu predsjednika Williama Clintona (1997-2001).
Ovo je stručno izrađen triler pun mnogih neugodnih vjerojatnosti. Dolazeći od republikanca i demokrata koji zajedno imaju dugogodišnje iskustvo u obavještajnom odboru Senata, Dvostruki čovek mora se uzeti minimalno kao mračno upozorenje o obavještajnim službama u našoj zemlji i drugdje.
Gary Hart (demokrata, Colorado) i William S. Cohen (republikanac, Maine), koji se smatraju dvojicom najizraženijih i najmaštovitijih članova američkog Senata, vode nas u urede, prostorije odbora i privatna mjesta sastanka Kongresa i kroz podzemne tunele vašingtonske električne mreže u svijet špijunaže i zavjera supersila.
Kada je porodica državnog sekretara brutalno ubijena, Thomas Chandler, stariji senator iz Connecticuta, imenovan je da vodi istragu o terorizmu. Njegova potraga za istinom vodi ga iz Washingtona u Miami, Moskvu, Amsterdam i Veneciju, sve do kobnog novembarskog dana u Dallasu. Njegova istražiteljica je zagonetna Elaine Dunham.
U ovom brzopoteznom trileru saznajemo što se događa kada ideolozi okrenu operacije tajnih službi svoje zemlje prema svojim ciljevima. I direktor CIA -e i pukovnik KGB -a strahuju da se Tom Chandler previše približava tajnama koje bi ih mogle uništiti. Dvostruki čovek nudi neprestanu akciju i intrigu uz bonus zajamčene autentičnosti.
William S. Cohen
Na mrežama C-SPAN:
William S. Cohen ima 638 video zapisa u videoteci C-SPAN, prvi put se pojavio odbor Predstavničkog doma iz 1974. godine kao republikanski predstavnik za drugi okrug Mainea. Godina s najviše video zapisa bila je 1993. sa 68 videa kao republikanski senator za Maine. Godina s najvećim prosječnim brojem pregleda po programu bila je 2017. sa prosjekom od 9.474 pregleda po programu. Najviše nastupa sa Henryjem "Hughom" H. Sheltonom (31), Billom Clintonom (28), Madeleine K. Albright (13). Najčešće oznake: NATO, Jugoslavija, Ministarstvo odbrane.
Maine memorijska mreža
Doprinos biblioteke Raymond H. Fogler
Senator Sjedinjenih Država William S. Cohen bio je poznat po pomaganju u porodičnom poslu, Bangor Rye Bread Bakery, dok je bio u Bangoru. Čini se da je ova fotografija snimljena prije Cohenove predizborne kampanje 1984. godine i da je čuvana sa fotografijama koje je osoblje senatora Cohena čuvalo za potrebe štampe i odnosa s medijima. Otac senatora Cohena, Reuben, nosi šešir na kojem piše: "Senator Bill Cohen", i njegova majka, Clara, pojavljuje se s desne strane.
O ovoj stavci
- Naslov: William S. Cohen s roditeljima Reuben i Clara Cohen, Bangor, ca. 1984
- Datum kreiranja: oko 1984
- Subject Date: oko 1984
- Grad: Bangor
- Županija: Penobscot
- Država: ME
- Mediji: Fotografski otisak
- Dimenzije: 25,5 cm x 20 cm
- Lokalni kod: MS0106_b04_002
- Kolekcija: William S. Cohen Papers
- Vrsta objekta: Image
Standardizirani naslovi predmeta
Druge ključne riječi
Za više informacija o ovoj stavci kontaktirajte:
Ova stavka je zaštićena autorskim i/ili srodnim pravima. Nije potrebna dozvola za korištenje slike niske rezolucije sa vodenim žigom za obrazovne svrhe ili kako je dopušteno primjenjivim autorskim pravima. Za sve ostale svrhe potrebna je dozvola.
Molimo vas da svoj komentar objavite ispod kako biste ga podijelili s drugima. Ako želite privatno podijeliti komentar ili ispravku sa osobljem MMN -a, koristite ovaj obrazac.
Autorska prava & copy2000-2021 Povijesno društvo Maine, Sva prava pridržana.
Mnoge slike na ovoj web stranici su na prodaju VintageMaineImages.com.
Maine Memory Network je projekt Povijesnog društva Maine. Osim u obrazovne svrhe, slika i sadržaj se ne smiju reproducirati bez dozvole. Pogledajte Uslove korišćenja.
William S. Cohen
Od svojih prvih dana u Washingtonu, sekretar William Cohen bio je istaknut kao budući američki lider. Godine 1974., za vrijeme njegovog prvog mandata u Kongresu, časopis TIME proglasio ga je jednim od "200 budućih lidera Amerike", a sljedeće godine ga je mlađa Privredna komora SAD -a proglasila jednim od "deset izuzetnih mladića u Americi". djelomično, državni sekretar Cohen postigao je funkciju republičkog kongresmena brucoša koji je dobio zadatak od Odbora za pravosuđe Doma da izgradi, na nacionalnoj televiziji, dokaznu bazu za opoziv predsjednika Nixona - i koji je zatim dao jedan od kritičnih glasova za opoziv . Ali to je također odražavalo priznanje da su intelektualni utjecaj, integritet, nezavisnost i uvjerljivost javnosti koje je pokazao tokom saslušanja u Watergateu najavljivali budućnost bez granica na nacionalnoj sceni. Na međunarodnom planu ugledala se i reputacija sekretara Cohena, koji je, uprkos političkom riziku koji bi mogao predstavljati za kongresmena brucoša, otputovao na Tajland 1974. godine kako bi uvjerio upornog saveznika nakon povlačenja američke vojske iz Vijetnama. U tom procesu, sekretar Cohen je uspostavio odnose koji su otada i drugdje širom svijeta procvjetali tokom četvrt stoljeća. Godine 1978. ubačen je u Senat, porazivši veoma cijenjenog aktuelnog predsjednika. Tokom prvih sedmica provedenih u Senatu, izabran je za predsjednika dva moćna pododbora, Pododbora Odbora za oružane snage za podmrežje za projektovanje snaga i snaga i Pododbora za nadzor Vlade za poslove Vlade. Prvi je bio odgovoran za desetine milijardi dolara za kupovinu pomorskih brodova i transportnih aviona velikog dometa, kao i za sigurnosnu politiku SAD-a u istočnoj Aziji, na Bliskom istoku i u Perzijskom zaljevu. Potonji je bio odgovoran za reformu procesa nabavke za cijelu saveznu vladu. Kao predsjedavajući Senatskog odbora za starenje, sekretar Cohen vodio je napore na poboljšanju efikasnosti Medicare i drugih programa zdravstvene zaštite i bio je centralni igrač u debatama o reformi zdravstvene zaštite 1990 -ih. Sekretar Cohen je također bio član Odabranog povjerenstva za obavještajne poslove jednu deceniju, a polovinu tog vremena služio je kao potpredsjednik, nadgledajući veliki budžet koji uključuje neke od najnaprednijih tehnologija nacije. Njegovo iskustvo i stručnost doveli su do njegovog odabira za člana Odbora & quotIran-Contra. njegovi napori u ime malog biznisa i rano vođstvo u smanjenju federalnog deficita donijeli su mu nagrade Nacionalne federacije nezavisnih privrednika i Nacionalne unije poreznih obveznika. Međunarodna stručnost sekretara Cohena prepoznata je njegovim odabirom u Upravni odbor Vijeća za spoljne odnose od 1989. do 1997. godine, čijom je studijskom grupom za Bliski istok predsjedavao. Predsjedavao je i bio član brojnih drugih studijskih grupa i odbora u Centru za strateške i međunarodne studije, Školi za napredne međunarodne studije i Brookings institutu. Uspostavio je i vodio američke delegacije na godišnjem Pacifičkom dijalogu u Kuala Lumpuru, kao i na Američko-arapskom dijalogu u Kairu, obje regionalne konferencije o ekonomskim i sigurnosnim pitanjima. Počevši od 1985., predvodio je američku delegaciju visokih dužnosnika izvršne vlasti i članova Kongresa na godišnjoj minhenskoj konferenciji o sigurnosnoj politici, koja okuplja visoke državne i industrijske dužnosnike iz cijele Europe i Azije. Služba sekretara Cohena u Domu i Senatu također je obilježena izbornim uspjehom. Bio je neporažen na šest uzastopnih izbora u Maineu, pobjeđujući svaki sa velikom razlikom. Godine 1996., za koji se opet očekivalo da će lako pobijediti onoga ko bi bio nominiran da ga izazove, sekretar Cohen zaprepastio je Maine i Washington objavom da neće tražiti ponovni izbor. Frustriran partizanskim zastojem, sekretar Cohen je najavio da će se vratiti privatnom životu kako bi promovirao međunarodno poslovanje i, kroz svoja pisanja i medije, promišljeniji javni diskurs o nacionalnim političkim pitanjima. Takođe je pokrenuo William S. Cohen Centar za međunarodnu politiku i trgovinu na Univerzitetu Maine. Predsjednik Clinton je, međutim, promijenio ove planove kada je zatražio od sekretara Cohena da vodi Ministarstvo odbrane, prvi put u modernoj američkoj istoriji kada je predsjednik izabrao izabranog zvaničnika iz druge stranke za člana svog kabineta. Na saslušanju za potvrdu u januaru 1997. godine, sekretar Cohen je postavio svoje prioritetne ciljeve kao sekretar i završio svoj mandat nakon što ih je sve ostvario. Obrnuvši stalni pad budžeta za odbranu koji je počeo 1980 -ih, sekretar Cohen uspio je modernizirati vojsku i zadržati spremnost za borbu protiv poništavanja problema regrutiranja i zadržavanja povećanjem plaća i drugih beneficija te jačanjem sigurnosnih odnosa sa zemljama širom svijeta u cilju preorijentacije od hladnog rata do izazova nove ere. Pod njegovim vodstvom, američka vojska je izvela najveću kampanju zračnog ratovanja od Drugog svjetskog rata, u Srbiji i na Kosovu, te izvela druge vojne operacije na svim kontinentima. Tokom svog mandata, sekretar Cohen održao je značajne sastanke sa stranim liderima u preko 60 zemalja. Objavljeni autor trinaest djela publicistike, beletristike i poezije, futurista sa diplomama klasične latinske i grčke književnosti, sin radničke porodice koja se podigla na najviše nivoe u vladi, to je bilo prirodno za Christian Science Monitor da ga nazove & quota true Renaissance Man. & quot On je također uspješan sportaš i imenovan je u sve državne košarkaške timove u državi Maine, te je, dok je bio u Bowdoinu, primljen u New England All-Star Hall of Fame . Godine 1987. Nacionalno udruženje košarkaških trenera imenovalo ga je All Star Team za srebrnu godišnjicu, a 2001. NCAA mu je uručila nagradu Theodore Roosevelt. Sekretar Cohen je trenutno član Upravnog odbora CBS korporacije. On je takođe saradnik za svjetske poslove za Bloomberg televiziju pružajući analize i komentare na glavne domaće i međunarodne vijesti. Nakon 31 godine javne službe, sekretar Cohen ostavlja za sobom rekord neusporedivih postignuća, integriteta i poštovanja, te sa sobom nosi znanje, ugled i odnose bez premca u cijeloj Americi i širom svijeta.
Kontaktirajte H. Andrew Schwartz
Glavni službenik za komunikacije
Kontaktirajte Paige Montfort
Koordinator za odnose s medijima, spoljni odnosi
William S. Cohen - Historija
Knjige Mitchella, Bowdoin Collegea, Clintona, Williama J., Dickey-Lincoln projekta, Iran-Contra, delegacije kongresa u Maineu, Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act Act, Maine politike, Vođe većine, Muskieja, Edmunda S., kultura Senata SAD-a, SAD Senatori
William S. Cohen rođen je 28. avgusta 1940. u Bangoru, Maine, u porodici Reubena i Clare Cohen. Pohađao je srednju školu Bangor, a 1962. diplomirao je na Bowdoin koledžu sa smjerom latinski jezik. Diplomirao je pravo na Pravnom fakultetu Univerziteta u Bostonu 1965. Radio je u advokatskoj kancelariji u Bangoru i na kraju postao partner. Bio je član Gradskog vijeća Bangora i bio je gradonačelnik Bangora od 1961. do 1962. 1972. Cohen je izabran u Zastupnički dom SAD -a, gdje je bio član Odbora za pravosuđe Doma tokom saslušanja u Watergateu. Izabran je u Senat 1978. godine nakon što je bio zastupnik u tri mandata. Ponovo je izabran 1984. i 1990. Bio je član Odbora za Iran-Contra. Nakon što se povukao iz Senata 1997., predsjednik Clinton ga je imenovao za ministra odbrane, na toj funkciji koju je obnašao do 2001. godine. 2001. godine osnovao je Cohen Group, konsultantsku firmu specijaliziranu za pitanja istočne Azije. Napisao je nekoliko knjiga, i beletrističkih i naučnih, uključujući Ljudi revnosti, koji je zajedno s Georgeom J. Mitchellom napisao u aferi Iran-Contra.
Intervju uključuje rasprave o: Bowdoin College Mitchell -ovom ulasku u političke kvalitete koji su Mitchella učinili uspješnim senatorom, radnim odnosom između Cohena i Mitchella, Cohenovim i Muskiejevim odnosom Muskiejev temperament Zen i umjetnost održavanja motocikla saradnja među članovima delegacije Mainea u Kongresu, Dickey-Lincoln projekat, Maine Indian Land Claims izdaje međustranačke vrijednosti Republikanske partije Maine u Maineu, šetnja Iran-Contra Mitchell preispituje Oliver North Ljudi revnosti i kako je obilazak knjige uznemirio Cohenove republikanske kolege posao većinskog lidera, kako su republikanci u Senatu gledali na Mitchell -ovu politiku na kojoj su Cohen i Mitchell zajedno radili Mitchell -ovu odluku da odstupi od Cohenove odluke da se povuče i postane ministar odbrane Cohen grupe Prozivka Singularnost je blizu i zdravstvena pitanja koja danas zanimaju Cohena.
Ovaj snimak i transkripcija su © 2011 Bowdoin College i predstavljeni su samo za privatno učenje, stipendiju ili istraživanje. Za sve ostale namjene, uključujući objavljivanje, umnožavanje i citiranje izvan „poštene upotrebe“ (Naslov 17, Kodeks Sjedinjenih Država), potrebno je pismeno pribaviti dozvolu od Odjela za posebne zbirke i arhive George J. Mitchell, Biblioteka Bowdoin College, 3000 College Station, Brunswick, Maine 04011-8421, Sjedinjene Američke države.
Brien Williams: Ovo je intervju za usmenu istoriju sa sekretarom Williamom S. “Billom” Cohenom za projekat usmene istorije Georgea J. Mitchella na Bowdoin College u Maineu. Sekretar Cohen je osnivač, predsjednik i glavni izvršni direktor grupe Cohen, a mi smo u njegovoj kancelariji u Washingtonu. Danas je četvrtak, 12. mart 2009., a ja sam Brien Williams. I vi i senator Mitchell ste alumnisti Bowdoin koledža, i pretpostavljam da vas je to okupilo nekoliko puta tokom godina, i kako to izgleda, da li je to nešto što smatrate važnim za podijeliti?
Bill Cohen: Pa, bilo je važno kako smo oboje imali veliko iskustvo u Bowdoinu, i svako ko želi da im sinovi ili kćeri steknu veliko obrazovanje o slobodnoj umjetnosti, očito je Bowdoin College za nas oboje bio izuzetno važan.
Nisam ranije poznavao Georgea. Mislim da sam za Georgea prvi put znao 1974. godine, kada se on kandidirao za guvernera, pa nismo bili zajedno u Bowdoinu, bio je malo ispred mene pa ga nisam poznavala. Poznavao sam njegovog brata, koji je bio košarkaš, a George je igrao i ja mislim da ne znam da li je počeo za Bowdoin, ali mislim da je i on malo igrao košarku, ali njegov brat je bio prilično poznat u cijeloj državi, onaj koji se zvao "Swisher".
Malo sam ga upoznao kada se kandidovao za guvernera, i tada sam se prvi put upoznao s njim. A onda nije bio uspješan u toj trci, pa je tada imenovan za saveznog sudiju. Nisam ga više vidio sve dok senator Muskie nije imenovan za državnog sekretara i odustao od svog mjesta, a senator Mitchell je odlučio da napusti doživotni posao, što sam smatrao prilično hrabrim potezom s njegove strane. On je zauzeo tu funkciju i završio mandat senatora Muskieja, a zatim se kandidovao za ponovni izbor. Tada sam ga upoznao, kada je došao u Senat, jer nas je samo dvoje i jako smo blisko sarađivali.
BW: Da li se sjećate te guvernerske rase?
BC: Znaš, ne znam. U tom trenutku sam bio više zaokupljen vlastitim reizborom. Upravo sam služio - vjerujem da je moj prvi mandat - u Domu, i to nije bilo sjajno u smislu da sam bio u odboru koji je morao razmotriti opoziv Richarda Nixona, pa sam prolazio kroz jako teško vrijeme sa svojom strankom pa se nisam fokusirao na namjesništvo. Govorio sam: "Kako mogu biti ponovo izabran?" Tako da nisam obraćao mnogo pažnje.
BW: Kad je George Mitchell imenovan da uspije ili zamijeni senatora Muskieja, je li to bilo iznenađenje?
BC: Bilo je to iznenađenje u smislu da je - ne da nije bio izvanredno kvalifikovan - pitanje, bilo me iznenadilo da će neko zauzeti položaj poput saveznog sudije i, uz svu tu sigurnost, reći: "Želim da budem senator , ”I trčite. Nakon što je '74. Izgubio, reći: "Sada ću ponovo ući u političku igru." Ali nakon što sam vidio Georgea na djelu, mogu vidjeti zašto je tako dobar u tome, mislim da je on samo odličan politički vođa. I bio sam ubeđen od trenutka kada je počeo sa mnom u Senatu da nema sumnje da će se popeti na vrh.
BW: Htio sam vas pitati o tome, jer se prve dvije godine nazivao senatorom sa zvjezdicom, jer je bio samo imenovan.
BW: I, ali i on je, prema vama, napravio trag čak i u toj situaciji.
BC: Oh, mislim na stvari koje se ističu kod Georgea, broj jedan je očito inteligencija, njegov integritet i njegova industrija mislim da su tri 'ja' kad pomislim na Georgea. Mislim, radi naporno, izuzetno je pametan i promišljen i možete mu vjerovati. Postoje ljudi za koje kažete: "U redu, vjerujete nekome i oni vam daju riječ, a on će, bez obzira koliko teško bilo, biti tamo", i on je jedan od njih.
On je takođe bio prilično partizan - i to kažem u komplementarnom smislu - da je očigledno bio u demokratskom taboru i da će biti lider stranke. Ali on je bio neko ko je uvijek mogao raditi s republikancima, i on i ja smo zajedno napisali knjigu i zajedno smo blisko radili na pitanjima. Shvatio sam to, kakva je njegova politička filozofija i gdje možemo pronaći sredinu, a gdje ne. Bilo mu je zadovoljstvo raditi, jer je bio toliko pametan i razumio složena pitanja, mogao ih je predstaviti na način koji ih je pojednostavio, u smislu da preuzmete svu ovu složenost i artikulirate je na način koji ima smisla. I bio je jako dobar u tome.
BW: Je li to bio kvalitet koji je vrlo široko dijelio sa Senatom?
BC: Mislim da su svi koji su došli u kontakt s Georgeom to razumjeli, da, da je to tip s kojim su htjeli da se pozabave teškim pitanjima, a zatim da ih mogu artikulirati za ostatak grupe s kojom je bio, da.
BW: Ali ono što sam namjeravao je: taj talent koji je imao, ta osjetljivost da shvati složena pitanja i analizira ih, da li je to bilo široko rasprostranjeno u Senatu, je li bilo puno drugih senatora koji su bili dobri poput njega?
BC: Pa, bilo je, Senat je veoma talentovana grupa ljudi. Ed Muskie je bio majstor u tome. Mogli biste uzeti Eda Muskieja, Jacka Javitsa, Abea Ribicoffa koji postoje, Howarda Bakera, on je bio u toj kategoriji. A bilo je i onih koji su viđeni kao pravi vođe u Senatu koji su imali tu sposobnost, pa mislim da je od početka bilo prilično evidentno da George to ima. Osim toga, bio je spreman izaći i naporno raditi u ime drugih kandidata. Ne možete biti većinski lider samo ako ste pametni ili samo artikulirani. Morate izaći van i provesti vrijeme i pomoći svojoj zabavi i pomoći svakom drugom članu koji se kandidira. Dakle, to sam mislio o industriji u kojoj je bio spreman naporno raditi tokom sedmice, a zatim idite na svaki događaj koji je mogao da pomogne drugim kandidatima.
BW: Jeste li ga gledali na izborima '82., Kada se prvi put kandidirao na izborima, gdje je sa jedan posto pao na šezdeset i jednu, mislim da je to ...?
BC: Pa, mogao sam vidjeti da dolazi. Mislim da mi je jednom pružena prilika i izloženost i data radna etika. Često smo prisustvovali istim događajima, vraćajući se državi. Da je to bilo na Festivalu cvijeta krumpira, ili Jastoga, ili Jaja, imali smo sve te festivale i događaje koji su bili nepolitički u smislu da nisu bili stranački, ali nas dvoje smo morali dobiti ustanite i razgovarajte. I tada sam mogao vidjeti, imao je sjajan smisao za humor, a mi smo se prilično dobro igrali i uvijek smo bili vrlo profesionalni među nama, ali dobro prijateljstvo. Tako da sam od samog početka mogao vidjeti da ga neće tući.
BW: Vi ste uspostavili odnos s Edom Muskiejem, kao što ste maloprije naveli, i volio bih znati kako biste to okarakterizirali, a zatim i kako se to promijenilo kada ga je George Mitchell zamijenio.
BC: Pa, Ed Muskie je bio, bio je nekako cijenjeni vođa. Bio je mnogo stariji kad sam došao. Zapravo sam razmišljao o tome da se bijem protiv Eda 1976. godine i bolje sam razmislio. Bio sam prilično izložen tokom ročišta o opozivu, a ocjena moje popularnosti na kraju svega toga bila je vrlo visoka, a oni su vršili ankete u kojima se govorilo: "Bože, čak bih mogao i pobijediti." Dugo sam razmišljao o tome, pisao sam o ovome u smislu stvari koje su uticale na mene, i bilo je mnogo onih koji su me nagovarali da se borim protiv Eda. I konačno sam došao na analizu, bio sam gore na planini Šećerna glava i rekao sam: "Odluku ću donijeti nakon što siđem s planine." Ne kao Mojsije ili bilo šta drugo, ali htio sam vremena da razmislim o tome.
I dok sam bio tamo, pročitao sam knjigu pod nazivom Zen i umjetnost održavanja motocikla, a ta je knjiga za mene možda imala dublje značenje, jer je govorila o ambicijama i o tome kako ljudi uvijek pokušavaju doći do vrha planine, a da ne shvaćaju da je život zaista na strani planine, i da ljudi koji uvijek nastoje doći na drugu poziciju mnogo im nedostaje na tom putu, a uvijek su samo jedan korak izvan koraka.
Razmišljao sam o tome u smislu, da, bio sam mlad, da, imao sam tada veliku popularnost, a Ed je bio stariji i možda nije imao istu vatru u trbuhu, šta god. Došao sam do zaključka, čak i gledajući brojeve, rekao, iako brojevi govore da bih vjerovatno mogao pobijediti, rekao sam, (pod pretpostavkom da je to slučaj, a nisam bio siguran da su brojke tačne) ne bih bio bolji senator od njega. Rekao sam: "Znate, ovo ne vrijedi, to ne bi bilo dobro za državu."
E sad, da sam imao dvadeset bodova prednosti i rekao, ovo je slem-zakucavanje, o tome sam mogao razmišljati drugačije, ali bilo je vrlo blizu i pomislio sam: „Pa, mogu izaći i voditi zaista sjajnu kampanju i Ja to mogu ”, ali tada sam pomislio,“ to ne bi bilo najbolje za državu. ” Mislim da je, znate, "On je na vrhuncu svoje karijere i još uvijek je bolji nego što bih ja bio." I trčao sam, čekao sam četiri godine i trčao protiv Billa Hathawaya.
Moramo biti blizu. Imate delegaciju iz Mejna, četiri osobe, a mi smo se okupljali barem jednom sedmično, pa ste imali dva kongresmena - kad sam prvi put stigao u Washington bila sam trojica demokrata i ja i - ali nas četvorica smo se morali sastajati svake sedmice ili svake druge sedmice o problemima Mejna. Dakle, riječ je o vrlo maloj pletenoj grupi i pokušavate održati prijateljstva i shvatiti da će doći do vremena oko ponovnih izbora kada oni neće nužno biti tako blizu, ali Eda sam jako dobro upoznao. Zamolio me je da odem u komisiju za otok Campobello, što sam i učinio i radio sam s njim na tome.
Mislim da je cijenio činjenicu da sam se ugledala na njega. Više kao očeva figura, i gotovo tako, jer kad sam prvi put vidio Eda Muskieja, bio sam student Bowdoina, a on je došao, tada je bio guverner Mainea, tamo sam ga prvi put vidio. Godinama kasnije, on je i dalje bio takva očeva figura.
BW: I njegovo fizičko prisustvo je bilo prilično impresivno, zar ne?
BC: Njegovo fizičko prisustvo i temperament koji je mogao upotrijebiti s velikom kalkulacijom. Nikada niste mogli reći kada je Ed stvarno bio ljut ili je samo bio lud da vas zastraši, ali bio je poznat po tome. Sa mnom je uvijek bilo, nikad nismo imali grubu riječ, uvijek je bilo jako, jako prijateljski, nikad nije bilo lošeg trenutka s Edom.
BC: Uzimam ga nazad. Možda je bilo vremena na Dickey-Lincoln projektu, ali to je ušlo u korov, ali gdje smo se borili protiv toga. Htio je izgraditi Dickey-Lincolna, ja sam se tome protivio, pa je to bio jedini put na koji mogu pomisliti.
BW: Gdje je bio George Mitchell po tom pitanju?
BC: Ne znam da je morao da se nosi sa tim. Mislim da jesmo, nisam siguran da li su ga do tada izvadili ili ne. Ali pretpostavljam da bi George bio za to, jer je to bilo demokratsko pitanje, u smislu otvaranja radnih mjesta. Morao bih to pretpostaviti, ali mislim da je problem riješen prije nego što je on tamo stigao.
BW: Zanimljivo je i volio bih da ga još malo istražite, jer je to imalo takve posljedice po okoliš ili probleme, i iznenadilo me da je Muskie barem bio za branu.
BC: Pa, mislim da je to bila situacija [gdje] je to zapravo bio Bill Hathaway, koji je tada bio kongresmen, koji je to zaista forsirao, ali mislim da je to organizirano radništvo učinilo ključnim pitanjem. I u pravu ste, Ed je bio gospodin okoliš, gospodin čisti, za sav posao koji je obavio oko čišćenja atmosfere, čiste vode, čistog zraka. Ovo je bilo jedno od onih lokalnih pitanja u kojima mislim da je Demokratska stranka ovo smatrala stvaranjem radnih mjesta u području koje je prilično osiromašeno, a otvaranje novih radnih mjesta, mislim, nadmašilo je brige za okoliš.
BW: Je li to postalo problem u vašoj kampanji s Hathawayom?
BC: Oh, jeste. I to je postalo pitanje-sad se vraćam-od mene je zatraženo da upravljam kampanjom Howarda Foleyja, a Howard se kandidirao 1968. pretpostavljam da je to bilo 196, '67, '68, možda je bilo '66 , to seže toliko unazad. Ali Howard Foley je zauzeo stav da je dao neku izjavu da će stajati i zveckati čašama šampanjca sa svakim ko misli da će brana Dickey-Lincoln ikada biti izgrađena, pa se po tom pitanju na neki način borio protiv Hathawaya i izgubio je. A kad sam se kandidirao, borio sam se i protiv stvaranja brane, pa je to postalo problem tokom kampanje.
BW: Mislim da bi bilo teško braniti zaštitu okoliša od radnih mjesta.
BC: Oh, bilo je. Bilo je i drugih pitanja u vezi s pitanjem indijskog zemljišnog prava koje se vjerojatno ne sjećate, ali Bill je zauzeo principijelan stav, mislio je da bismo trebali ispitati to pitanje, a ja sam krenuo za njim, jer su oni tvrdili, Penobscots i Passamaquoddys, ali prvenstveno Penobscots, tvrdili su da imaju pravo na dvije trećine kopnene mase Mainea, i naravno da sam mislio da je to prilično nečuveno, ali u svakom slučaju to je postalo veći problem od Dickey-Lincolna.
BW: Je li se to proširilo i na razdoblje Georgea Mitchella, ili ne, u indijske zemlje?
BC: Ne, nije jer mislim da smo Ed i ja postigli kompromis po tom pitanju.
BW: Pa kako je tada bilo preći u kolegu Georgea Mitchella u to vrijeme?
BC: Pa George, morat ćeš razgovarati s njim o tome, ali znali smo se šaliti na tu temu. Dao sam mu savet, rekao sam mu da provede prvih šest meseci samo slušajući i ne govoreći previše, a onda to koristi kao deo, kao deo šala, imali smo rutinu u kojoj je rekao: „Koen uvek rekao mi je samo da šutim, a onda je ustajao i držao sve te govore, pa sam se zato kandidirao za većinskog lidera, tako da ne bih morao slušati sve Cohenove govore. ”
Ali George i ja smo od samog početka imali dobro prijateljstvo i nismo imali poteškoća u radu, ali on je više bio vršnjak. Ironija je bila u tome što je on sada bio mlađi senator, a ja stariji senator, iako je on bio malo stariji, ali ja sam to cijelo vrijeme koristio protiv njega, o mlađem senatoru, pa smo se tome puno smijali , bilo mi je lijepo oko toga, ali smo otprilike bili jednaki.
BW: I nastavili ste održavati te sastanke u četiri osobe kroz -
BW: I kakvi su bili?
BC: Pa, svi smo se dogovorili da ćemo raditi zajedno. U bilo kojoj državi imate konkurenciju oko toga ko će za nešto zaslužiti. Mislim, svi žele reći: "Hej, ja sam ovo uradio", ili "Ja sam ovo uradio", ili "Sačuvao sam ovaj posao", ili "Ja sam ovo stvorio." Ono što smo odlučili učiniti je da bismo uvijek objavili bilo koje priopćenje za javnost kao delegacija Kongresa, a ne kao pojedinci, pa smo htjeli da ljudi iz Mainea znaju da radimo zajedno za njih.
Unutar toga je postojao podtekst o tome da još uvijek traje natjecanje, a ponekad bi netko izašao ispred i dao izjavu, a da to nije prošlo kroz delegaciju. No, uglavnom je to funkcioniralo prilično dobro.
BW: Je li to bilo uobičajeno?
BC: Ne. Mislim da smo mislili da smo prilično jedinstveni, mogli smo uzeti četiri osobe i ostaviti po strani razlike i reći: "Delegacija kongresa u Maineu najavila je danas ...", a zatim bi imali citate svakog od nas, složili bismo se oko saopštenje za javnost. Na taj način smo ljudi u Maineu htjeli otkloniti ovo stalno natjecanje ko dobiva nešto samo u maloj državi poput Mainea, a ljudi iz Mainea htjeli su da radimo zajedno, a ne da pokušavamo izlagati brodove i zahtijevati kredit. Dakle, radilo je prilično dobro.
A u drugim državama, imate New York, California, znate, [delegacija] od četrdeset pet, to ne funkcionira dobro. Tako mala država, mislim da su druge države vjerovatno imale isto iskustvo da su male, ali ja sam mislio da smo prilično jedinstvene.
BW: Šta je sa republikanskom strankom u Mejnu koja je pomalo jedinstvena?
BC: Pa, sama zabava je bila, nekako je podijeljena. Imate stranačke umjerenosti, imali ste prave konzervativce, neke liberale, granica između liberalno-umjerenog ponekad se prilično zamagli, ali onda ste imali one koji su zaista bili strogo konzervativni, pa je s vremena na vrijeme postalo izazov sve to spojiti.
BW: Kad sam rekao Republikanska stranka u Maineu, rekao si: "Oh".
BC: Pa, samo se morate zapitati šta se dogodilo. Bilo je teško jer mislim da postoji konzervativna baza, a onda imate umjerenost, imate Olimpiju i Susan Collins - ja sam se svrstao u tu kategoriju - uvijek je postojala takva tenzija koja, znali smo da se moramo obratiti mnogo širem segment. Da bi Republikanska stranka preživjela u Maineu, morali smo reći: "Ne možemo biti samo brojači graha, ne možete imati zeleno sjenilo", morate govoriti o društvenim programima i stvarima koje ljudi potreba, kao i strogi ideološki stav. Dakle, to je uvijek bio izazov, i zato mislim da smo uspjeli u prolasku kroz cijelu državu.
I know when I first ran for office, number one, I was told with my name I’d never get elected to begin with, and I never gave that a second thought. I said, “That’s moot, by that point, and I think if they have a Muskie they can have a Cohen.” But within that context of how do you build a party, I was told to stay out of Lewiston. They said, “Don’t even bother,” they said, “it’s ninety percent Democrat, they’re never going to vote for you.” I said, “Well then, I’ll make some inroads and who knows, maybe they’ll vote for me one day. But why would you give it up?” So I used to campaign in Lewiston, in fact I had my brochures printed, one side was in English, the other side was in French, just to say that I know it’s Franco-American heavily, and they’re an older generation that don’t speak English, or speak it well, and I’m going to make a dedicated effort to reach out and stay with people in Lewiston, different families, which I did on my walks, et cetera.
So I made a conscious effort to say, if there is – the Democratic Party in Maine, the core Democrats of Maine, the state of Maine, whether you’re a Democrat or a Republican, you get pretty close to the center. Most of the values of those people in Lewiston-Auburn area, they weren’t any different from those of the Republicans up in the northern part of the state. You talk about their family issues, the work ethic, the values that they have, there wasn’t much difference. You just found that over the years that they were divided, and if you got below the perception of the parties, you go and talk to the people about what they really treasured and what their values were, you could find great crossover ability. Which is what I think we’ve been able to do, at least those of us who have been successful.
BW: You were quite an incubator for successful Republicans, too.
BC: Well, the walk helped. The walk was a major thing. And frankly, I had my doubts when it first was proposed. It was a Bowdoin student who said that he had been involved in a walk campaign, and then I read about Lawton Chiles. He didn’t walk the complete state, and neither did the governor of Illinois, but I was intrigued by the concept. I said, “How do I make this work?” And once I started it, there was no doubt in my mind that it was going to be successful. I averaged about twenty-two miles a day, and I stopped and I shook hands with every person I met along the way, every store that I went into, every fruit stand or whatever it was, every shoe factory, I went in every place, I still maintained twenty-two-miles-a-day pace.
And I slept in different homes every night, picked at random. I’d send somebody up ahead and say, “Ask them if I can stay there,” and most said, “yes.” Some said, no, they didn’t have a place that I could stay. I slept on couches, chairs, I slept wherever they could put me up and it was – in Lewiston I stayed with, on the third floor of a tenement building, slept out on the porch in a chair one night. So I got to know their families, and that personal connection, that you relate to them in their home, on their turf so to speak, and you listen to what the issues are that affect them. Boy, it gives you a whole different perspective other than this pontificating.
BW: Now, excuse my ignorance, was this when you were running for the House, or - ?
BC: That’s when I ran for the House.
BW: The first time.
BC: Hmm-hmm. But that was kind of trail blazing because, in the sense that anyone who has run by walking has usually won. Olympia did some, Susan did some, David Emery did some as well, but the walk became a very important symbol. And I used to joke about it, saying I was out there during the rain and it didn’t matter, I was out there doing that twenty-two miles, that, “Anyone who wants that job that bad and will do what he’s doing, I guess we better vote for him.” It was that kind of psychology, seeing the effort I would put into it, that they knew that I was going to work hard.
BW: Were there certain issues – I’m sort of breaking things up here, with you working with Mitchell since he arrived in ‘80 until Iran-Contra, because I want to stop with that, which was ‘87. Were there things in the early ‘80s that you and George worked on, or were really salient to the times or-?
BC: You know, I can’t think of it. I’m trying to think what the issues would have been. Whatever they were, if they affected Maine we were together. I don’t think we ever had an issue which we split on. I can’t think of one.
BW: So then you did come together at Iran-Contra.
BC: Jesmo. I was serving as the co-chair of the Intelligence Committee with David Boren, and George had been put on the Iran-Contra Committee, Bob Dole put me on, and the two of us, although we didn’t talk much during the course of that, I was really impressed when George made a great examination of Oliver North in particular. I thought that that was a moment for George where I think his colleagues saw him in a light that said, “This is going to be our next leader.” I think that was the moment. If you look at things that he had done, when they saw that, with all the pressure and the tension and the fact that Ollie North was such a captivating figure, I mean we were the bad guys in that, the committee, and George and I wrote about this in our book. But I mean how George handled the issue and what Ollie was saying about his lives, and I think that that really kind of separated George from the others who were going to compete for that position, I think that was a defining moment.
BW: I found his statement to Ollie North on the web.
BW: And watched it with of course keen interest, having remembered it somewhat. Were you in the room when he delivered that?
BC: I was, and I slipped him a note saying that I was never more proud of him than I was that day because it was one of those moments that really brought into focus what the issues were, and I thought he did it better than anyone at the time.
BW: You and he wrote the book Men of Zeal, and that was published in ‘88.
BC: We wrote that in eleven weeks’ time. We were approached shortly after the hearings, and it was an agent that I had used for some of my other writings, and he said, “Gee, it would be great if the two of you wrote a book,” and he said, “but you’d have to finish it by January 15,” and this was in November. I said, “We can’t write a book in that short time,” I said, “well, we will do it.” So we sat down and we wrote the thing in eleven weeks.
BW: You hadn’t learned your lesson, because one of the points you make is that you had to write the report on Iran-Contra under such a deadline, too.
BC: That’s true. But we finished the report, and I think what we said is, here are the lessons, do not find yourself in this position. As far as the book was concerned, it was just the publisher. And here’s the other side of this story – and I knew this at the time – but if we wrote the book, we finished it by January, they gave us January 15th to do some rewrite on it so a little bit of slippage, but usually it takes six months to get a book out. I mean usually it’s a year, but once you finish the manuscript, most publishers take at least six months, so they were planning on a September pub date for the book.
Well, I was the co-chair of George’s opponent in that race – David Emery was running for the Senate against George – so I also knew the book is going to come out in September and the two of us are going to be going around the state promoting the book, which is what happened.
The Republicans were really unhappy with me, and I said, “Look, we had this experience, this is a non-political book. Yes, I’m with George Mitchell, yes I’m the co-chair of David Emery’s election bid, but I told David way back last year that this book is going to come out, and it’s going to come out about this time, and just be prepared for it.” Well, there were a lot of Republicans who were pretty upset and I think they took a vote, they wanted me to leave the party, and the vote was defeated. It was a serious issue.
BW: Looking back on the book and those times, are there any things that have occurred to you since to update or change or anything, or does it pretty much stand as it is?
BC: Well, I say modestly, I think it’s the best book written about that experience in terms of trying to synthesize who the players were, what the issues were, how we looked at ourselves as critically as we could. I thought it was a good piece of writing, and it stands the test of time. I go back and read it today, I’d say pretty much on the mark.
BW: Did you imagine that Byrd and Dole conferred before they made the appointments to that committee? Because it surprised me that two senators from the same state would have been on it.
BC: I think, they obviously had to, they conferred on the numbers, how many people were going to be on the committee, but whether they made judgments about who was going to be on it, I think they each left that for themselves. And I think what probably more than anything influenced it, was that David Boren was the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, so it would be a little bit awkward to take the chair of the Intelligence Committee but not take the ranking member. He treated me as almost a co-chair of the committee with him. So I think that was a decisive factor, that we had actually done a preliminary investigation into the Iran-Contra event on the Senate Intelligence Committee, so Bob Dole no doubt took that into account saying, “Why wouldn’t we put the guy that knows more about it than anybody else on our side?”
BW: So how do you explain George Mitchell’s fast track to leader in the Democratic Party?
BC: I think from what I said earlier, that his obvious intellectual capability, the fact that he is such an industrious individual, and is so patient. Now frankly, I don’t have his patience. Being a majority leader, the image of all the great things you’re doing, most of the time is spent dealing with ninety-nine other egos, who have different schedules. And the job of majority leader, because of the Senate Rules, is basically to try to move legislation through an institution which is designed to slow things down. Everything has to be done by consent, so when you see somebody on the floor saying, “I ask unanimous consent,” well if one person objects you don’t get to do it.
So George would spend I would say probably seventy-five percent of his time negotiating consent agreements. He had to deal with Dole, he’d have to deal with his own party, you’ve got people who are out campaigning or trying to raise money for their campaigns saying, “Gee, I can’t be there, can you postpone the vote until the next day?” And then constantly trying to put all that together. You have to have a lot of patience, and he has that, a reservoir of patience. I don’t. I mean I have much, I think, “No, let’s move ahead, let’s not wait.” That’s why he’s been successful.
BW: Some said that his start as leader was kind of slow, and he was a little bit quieter than they expected and whatnot. So he grew into the job?
BC: I don’t think any of us really appreciate the dimensions of what the demands are for a majority leader. And as I said, most of it, you make these assumptions about you’re just dealing with big picture legislation, when in fact it’s the day in and day out nuts and bolts of dealing with making the institution function, and I think that obviously nothing quite prepares you for that. You get into the job and then you’re dealing with someone like Dole and, who’s been around a long time and is a master tactician as well, and you want to be sure that you don’t do something which compromises your position without understanding the job. So I think he did it just right.
BW: You were probably in the position of going back to the Republican caucus and explaining this fellow to some degree, would that be right?
BC: Well, there was no explanation. What was it, “The Song of Bernadette?” “… for those who understand there’s not need to explain, for those who don’t understand there is no explanation.” It’s one of those situations, and they all respected George Mitchell, had enormous respect for him. They didn’t like him, in the sense that, ‘Dammit, he’s too good.’ In other words, he’s too good at beating us, making a speech and taking an issue and being able to articulate it in a way that made us look bad and impotent.
And so there was resentment, but it wasn’t personal, it was, “Oh, he’s at it again, he’s so clever, he’s put us in a box, he’s done this, he brought about George Walker Bush’s defeat, getting Bush to go back on his pledge about no new taxes.” It was always an admiration and a resentment that he was as good as he was and as facile in terms of taking these issues and then putting the Democrats in the best light and the Republicans in a less good light. So it was admiration. I’m not saying it well. They admired him, but they said, “God, he’s a partisan Democrat.” And I’d say, “Well yes, he is partisan, and that’s kind of what this business is about.”
But they always said, “But you can deal with him, and you can trust him.” And that becomes important not only within your own party, but the other party. If you give your word to Dole, or to any of us, you had to rely on that, and no one ever had a question about it.
BW: I think it was David Emery who said that the press treated George Mitchell as being fairly bipartisan, but you all knew that he was very partisan.
BC: He’s very partisan. And I don’t think he would deny that.
BW: In fact he said, “Most partisan ever,” David Emery did.
BC: I don’t know if he’s the most partisan ever. I think that he was one of the most effective ever.
BW: Any comments about the George Mitchell-Bob Dole working relationship? Were there times when you saw them -?
BC: They really liked each other, they got along famously. And I think that’s maybe part of the resentment about, maybe they thought Dole was a little bit too accommodating, yes, if anything. I think Dole respected George, and Dole himself, conservative as he was, was pretty moderate to deal with behind the scenes and he could appreciate everybody had to deal with their own constituencies, all politics being local, and he was not someone who was going to slam you because you took a different position. So I think that Dole had obviously the support of the Republicans, but they thought maybe that he wasn’t tough enough in dealing with Mitchell, though.
BW: Now, when you came to the Senate, am I right, Mansfield was the leader and Hugh Scott was the minority leader?
BC: I’m trying to think. Scott was not there long, when I came in. I’d have to go back, you know, I don’t remember interacting with him at all.
BW: Right, but you were there over the course of a lot of leaders.
BW: Where would you rank Mitchell among them, or?
BC: I’d put him up at the top. I didn’t know Mansfield well he was very quiet, stoic, rarely said anything – I’d watch him on television and, “Yep, nope” – but highly respected by his colleagues. I would say that George, during the time that I was there, he’d have to be right up at the top, one or two.
BC: He, I put George in the same league as Baker, I do.
BW: Um, let’s see -
BC: And Howard was one of our best I’m really fond of Howard Baker.
BW: Legislation – I don’t want to get deeply into these matters and whatnot, but we’ve mentioned Dickey-Lincoln, and what about the Loring Air Force Base, was that an issue?
BC: No, no, we both worked on that. That was never an issue. I mean again, on issues dealing with the people of Maine, we didn’t differ.
BW: And what was your position on Clean Air and Water? You were with him.
BC: I didn’t like it as much when I was on the city council of the mayor of Bangor, because I said, “My God, how do we go to secondary, tertiary clean-up facilities?” And Dow Air Force Base was moving out, we had very little in the way of revenue coming in, but from a philosophical point of view, I’ve always been over there.
BW: On military matters, one thinks of Scoop Jackson right away, and then Sam Nunn, sort of a pair, and yourself very much in there, where was George Mitchell on military issues?
BC: When it came to Maine he was with us. I can’t recall his voting record on some of the other systems, but when you’re dealing with Bath Iron Works, no one is ever going to be against that, so George and I worked very closely together on getting destroyers, and frigates initially, that was before George got there, we moved up to the destroyers when he was there. I’m trying to think, I don’t know what his position was on the other major weapons systems. I suspect he probably was less supportive of them.
BW: He announced his retirement. Was that a surprise to you?
BC: Bilo je. He let me know he was going to be announcing it, but I was surprised that he was leaving. He left, Warren Rudman, another great senator, I mean outstanding, and he and George had worked together on a number of key issues, but both of them decided to leave [in] ’94 I announced two years later. I can’t recall now why George, what motivated him.
BW: You can’t recreate that telephone conversation, or whatever it was when he told you?
BC: It wasn’t on the phone we talked in the Senate. He told me he was going to make an announcement, and I was surprised. I just can’t recall now what his rationale was but maybe he felt the same thing that I was feeling two years later.
BW: And that’s true, that was what motivated you to depart as well.
BC: I had become increasingly disenchanted with how politics was being played out. I kept looking, being half Irish I have a Gothic preoccupation with time, and I kept seeing the sand slip through the hourglass and I kept thinking, ‘How much more time do I have? And do I want to find myself in the position where, okay, I can run and I can get reelected, and then what?’ And then I’ll be at an age where I’ll have to run for reelection because I can’t do anything else, and I never wanted to be in that position when I saw some of my older colleagues who, they’re in their eighties and they were dysfunctional and they had no place to go. And I never wanted to be in that position, so I decided that if I was ever going to have one more shot at a different career, it was going to be, I had to retire. And so that’s when I announced my retirement: ’96-’97.
Plus it became, the partisanship, the fact that it took so long to do anything. Most of my time was spent in quorum calls, and I kept thinking, ‘I’ve been here too long, it’s been twenty-four years, and I can’t do this anymore.’ I didn’t like fund-raising, I was not good at it, I didn’t like having to go outside of the state to raise money, but you couldn’t run a campaign on what you can raise in Maine. And then there were some other external factors, there was a two-term limitation that was voted on by the state legislature, or maybe on a state referendum, where the people of Maine had spoken that they wanted their politicians at no more than two terms. Well, I had already had my third and looking at a fourth, and I said, “Well, it doesn’t apply to me,” because they couldn’t apply it to the Congress, that particular vote. And I said, “Well, if that’s what they really feel, then what am I doing here? And I’ve had eighteen years in the Senate, six in the House, and maybe they’re right, maybe it’s time to have somebody else.” And so I just decided that I was going to leave.
BW: And when did Bill Clinton come calling for -?
BC: Actually it was not until after he got reelected. I had had business cards printed up, called The Cohen Group, oddly enough, I had just signed a lease agreement downtown, and my books were all packed and I mentally was on my way out, there was no more legislation to take care of, the session was over. And then I got a call from the White House and they said, “The president would like to have lunch with you, you want to come down?” I said, “Sure, absolutely.” And I didn’t know him, other than shaking his hand a couple times in very superficial settings.
We came in, we had lunch together, he just wanted to talk philosophically about things, about the world, and nothing in the way of DOD or anything else, and it was a good conversation. It lasted about an hour, an hour-and-a-half, and I guess we both felt better that we knew each other.
And then [the] next time I saw him I was over in Thailand giving a speech to the - The U.S.-Thai Business Council had invited me to give a speech over there, and it turns out that Bill Clinton was there at the celebration of the king’s birthday. And I was in the audience and I had on a yellow tie with white elephants – it was a Jim Thompson tie, and famous for his silk. And President Clinton came down after one of the events and he looked at my tie, he said, “Are those Republican elephants or Thai elephants?” And I said, “Well today they’re Thai elephants.” And I didn’t see him again, I went on to Malaysia, came back, and then I had another call and went down to the White House and had a more serious talk at that point, and then we had reached I think an understanding, and he said, “Well I’m not sure I’m going to offer you the job.” And I said, “I’m not sure I can take it.”
But I said there were a couple of things that we had to resolve. Number one, I wanted to reassure him, if he were to offer and if I were to accept, he would never have to worry about me going back door to my former colleagues up on the Hill. In other words, “Can you believe what these s.o.b.’s down here are talking about?” and putting a call in to Trent Lott or one of the leaders up there. I said, “You’ll never have to worry about that, I would never do that. And so this is going to be tough for you, because you’ve got Democrats who are going to say, ‘You got a Republican sitting in our meetings?’ It’s going to be hard for you.” And I said, “You’ll never have to worry about me, but what I need is a pledge by you that you’ll never involve me in any political discussion, under any circumstances. I don’t want to be there, I don’t want to be invited there, I don’t want to sit in any meeting where it’s going on, just let me run the Defense Department.”
So that was what I was going to ask for. So nothing more was said. Time went by, and one night my wife and I were at the White House for a Christmas party and I was standing in line, and Al Gore came over, just came up, stood next to me, and not making any kind of display he said, “Can you take a call from the president tomorrow between eight and eight thirty?” And I said, “Sure.” Went home that night. My wife and I talked about it, and I was still a little not sure what this all meant, because I had promised her, I said, “Once I leave the Senate we’re going to have a whole different life.” And she said, “Are you crazy, this is a chance of a lifetime.” I said, “Yes, but I promised you.” She said, “Don’t worry about it, we’ll put that off for four years.” So she was very supportive and she let me off the hook in terms of the pledge.
Then I said, “This is not going to be easy, and by the way, the phone call tomorrow could be just as well saying, ‘Look, I thought about it, this is not going to work, I’ve got too much opposition in the Democratic Party, you’ll be in a tougher position and this just won’t work.’” So I said, “It could go either way.”
Anyway, the next day came, eight, eight fifteen, eight thirty, no phone call, so I took our dog out, I said, “I’m going out for a walk.” And she says, “You can’t go, the White House is going to call you.” I said, “Well, they’ll call back.” So I went outside, and sure enough, they called while I was gone. And I came back in the house with Lucky and she said, “The White House called.” I said, “Fine, we can call them back”. Called them back, and it was a very short conversation. President Clinton said, “I want you as secretary of defense.” And I said, “I accept, but don’t forget the condition on which I accept.” He said, “You got it.”
So I hung up the phone and my wife said, “What condition are you talking about?” And I told her what the condition was. To his word, he never once involved me in anything, it was just a great relationship.
BW: When did you start incubating the idea of The Cohen Group?
BC: My last year in office. I had become increasingly unhappy with what was going on with the Senate, and I was going through the motions of raising funds, and I did, I made one trip out west, I went to Chicago, I was in St. Louis, then I went to Los Angeles, and I stopped in Colorado on the way back. By the time I finished the last fund raiser, they were all successful, I said, “I can’t do this any more, I don’t want to do this any more.” And I landed back in Washington, a day went by, I picked up the phone, I called everybody, I said, “Look, I’ve reconsidered,” and all the money that I had raised, I sent it back to everybody.
BW: And what kind of vision did you have for The Cohen Group?
BC: What I thought was I would, I had been doing a lot of traveling into the Asia region in particular, and I thought, “Well, I’ll start a consulting group and take advantage of all the trips I’ve made to various parts of the world and see if it works.” And Sam Nunn and I were also talking. Senator Nunn left the same year, there were thirteen of us who left, and Sam I knew was going to go with King and Spalding one third of his time, then he was going to devote one third of his time to public issues, and then we were going to work out an arrangement where one third of his time and my time we would be working together on issues. And so, that didn’t come to pass.
BW: But in ‘01 I guess you then started The Cohen Group.
BC: I finished up on, at noon on January 20, 2001, I took off Sunday and we started on Monday.
BW: You’re a workaholic.
BC: Well, yes, one day of rest, and started off, and there were just three of us at the time and now there are some forty, I think, last count probably forty-three, forty-five or so now.
BW: I read parts of Prozivka, your diary of your first year in the Senate where you spoke about peacocks and egos of majestic proportions and so forth.
BC: Some of the language is a little bit inflated, but that’s what I felt at the time.
BW: Right, but I’m wondering how different your diary would have been in ‘94 or ‘95.
BC: I think there would have been much more a level of frustration, just the accumulation of it, to see all the big issues that weren’t being addressed, and they said, “Well, we’ll delay that, or we’ll put that off ‘til next year, there’s always a next year to do it.” And a lack of I thought courage in facing up to the issues. If you’re talking about Social Security, we know what needs to be done. We’re living longer, I will be sixty-nine this year, I intend to work for another five, ten years, whatever. So for the young people starting out, they should not think about retiring at sixty-five because their life span – I’m holding a conference on next Monday on wellness, and I’ve got experts coming in from various fields to talk about how we take better care of ourselves, how we extend life, quality of life. And I’ve got Ray Kurswell, who has written The Singularity is Near. Now, it won’t be good for us perhaps, but he maintains, he’s been writing about this for a long time, that if we could live another twenty years or twenty-five years, that there’s such a confluence today of biotechnology and nanotechnology and medical science that we will be able to extend life almost indefinitely, quality of life. And it has all kinds of associated ramifications. Do you really want to live that long? Who can support you if you’re living that long? I mean all of the other issues that are associated with it, but we are on the cusp of breakthroughs in medical technology which are astounding.
I’ll give an example. I’m sitting here with two steel hips. I went to the hospital on a Thursday, had the surgery, came home on a Sunday, I went to work Monday and, on both occasions, without a cane or a crutch. And what I wanted to demonstrate, one time I went on television the day after I got out of the hospital and walked onto the set, I wanted to say, “This is what’s possible with medical science. Twenty years ago this would not have been possible, today it is,” and that’s very elemental. And now you’re looking at what Ray Kurswell talks about in terms of nanobots, robots basically the size of cells, into the body, repairing organs internally. All sorts of exciting things that are being developed.
Out in Silicon Valley they’re creating something called the Singularity Center. You’ve got these brilliant physicists and medical doctors who are now converging these technologies to provide quality of life, dealing with Parkinson’s, all these other things. It’s exciting to think about.
So what I’m trying to do now – to deviate from our conversation – is I’m holding a conference on wellness. I’ve got Deepak Chopra coming in to talk about spirituality, because the mind-body connection is very real, and Dean Ornish and Michael Roysen, a bunch of experts coming together to say, “What do we do to take better care of ourselves, from diet and exercise? And what are the obstacles? Why can’t we do these things? Why are there no whole food stores in the inner cities? And what can we do?” I mean all the junk food. And look at the problem of diabetes. We’ve got an epidemic in this country, and it’s caused by obesity. Well, why are we getting obese? You know, pretty simple answers, but how do you break it down?
So, I don’t know what got me onto this, but to talk about things that can be done and need to be done, and we’re not facing up to these. And on Social Security, yes, we’re going to live to be in our eighties, and our children will live to be ninety and maybe even a hundred, and so we’ve got to change our institutional program structures. And we’re not doing it we’re not facing up to it. And everybody, it’s the third rail no one wants to step on the third rail. Well, we need to start stepping on third rails. I think Obama, to his credit, is starting to take these issues on.
BW: How do you think George Mitchell ought to be remembered as time goes on?
BC: I think he’ll be remembered as a great statesman, as a superior negotiator. If you had to take the movie, or a book, it would be called The Negotiator, it would be George. Yes, I think that’s how he’ll be seen, as somebody who obviously was a great public servant, and again, intelligence, integrity, industry, and I’d add patience on top of that, he had enormous patience.
--> Cohen, William S.
William S. Cohen was born on August 28, 1940 in Bangor, Maine, to Reuben and Clara Cohen. He graduated from Bangor High School in 1958, from Bowdoin College in 1962 and received his law degree in 1965 from Boston University Law School. He worked as a lawyer in Bangor, taught business classes at University of Maine and Husson College, and volunteered for community service. Cohen was elected to public office as a city councilor in Bangor in 1969 and as Mayor of Bangor for a two-year term in 1970-1972. He became a fellow at the John F. Kennedy Institute of Politics in 1972. He was elected as a Republican to the U.S. House of Representatives in November of 1972 from Maine's Second Congressional District. He sat as a junior member on the House Judiciary Committee during the Nixon impeachment inquiry concerning Watergate. Cohen was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1978 and was a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence investigating the Iran-Contra affair during President Reagan's administration. He maintained an interest in government ethics throughout his career. Senator Cohen also served on the Governmental Affairs Committee, the Committee on Aging, and the Armed Services Committee. He retired from the Senate in 1996 and served as Secretary of Defense from January 1997 to January 2001. An accomplished author, Cohen has published books of poetry, fiction, and non-fiction.
From the description of Papers, 1955-2001 (bulk 1972-2001). (Nepoznato). WorldCat record id: 51843539
|REAL NAME:||William Sebastian Cohen|
|MARTIAL STATUS:||U toku|
|TATTOOS:||N / A|
|AGE GENERATION:||Silent Generation|
|DAYS SINCE BIRTH:|
The 80-year-old American politician has done well thus far. Majority of William’s money comes from being a politician. CelebsMoney has recently updated William Cohen’s net worth.
House of Representatives and Senate [ edit | uredi izvor]
In the 1972 election, Cohen won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, representing Maine's 2nd congressional district, succeeding Democrat William Hathaway, who was elected to the US Senate.
Senator William Cohen early in his career
During his first term in Congress, Cohen became deeply involved in the Watergate investigation. As a member of the House Judiciary Committee, he was one of the first Republicans to break with his party, and voted for the impeachment of President Richard Nixon. Za to vrijeme, Time magazine magazine named him one of "America's 200 Future Leaders".
After three terms in the House, Cohen was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1978, defeating William Hathaway in his first bid for reelection. He was reelected in 1984 and 1990, serving a total of 18 years in the Senate (1979–1997). In 1990 he defeated Democrat Neil Rolde.
In 1994 Cohen investigated the federal government's process for acquiring information technology, and his report, Computer Chaos: Billions Wasted Buying Federal Computer Systems, generated much discussion. He chose not to run for another Senate term in 1996 Susan Collins, who had worked for Cohen, was elected to succeed him. (former Maine senator, Olympia Snowe, had also worked for Cohen while he was in the House of Representatives.)
While in the Senate, Cohen served on both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Governmental Affairs Committee (1979–1997) and was a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee 1983–1991 and again 1995–1997. He also participated in the drafting of several notable laws related to defense matters, including the Competition in Contracting Act (1984), the Montgomery G.I. Bill Act (1984), the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986), the Intelligence Oversight Reform Act (1991), the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (1996), and the Information Technology Management Reform Act, also known as the Clinger-Cohen Act (1996).
William S. Cohen
(born 1940). After the 1996 election President Bill Clinton, a Democrat, wanted to start his second term with a Republican in his Cabinet to smooth relations with the Republican majority in Congress. On December 5, 1996, he named William S. Cohen his next secretary of defense, and the Senate readily approved the appointment the following January. During 18 years as a Republican senator, Cohen had won the respect of colleagues in both parties for his leadership on defense policy and government ethics. He was known as a moderate with broad interests, a talent for compromise, and an independent conscience that did not always follow party lines.
William Sebastian Cohen was born in Bangor, Maine, on August 28, 1940. His father was a baker. He excelled in both academics and athletics at Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine, where he was named to the New England Hall of Fame basketball team and graduated cum laude in 1962. He was married and had two sons by the time he received his law degree cum laude at Boston University in 1965.
Cohen returned to Bangor to practice law as a partner in the law firm Paine, Cohen, Lynch, Weatherbee & Kobritz. Between 1968 and 1972 he also served as assistant county attorney, taught at the University of Maine, and served on the Bangor city council. He was serving as mayor of Bangor in 1972 when he became a candidate for the United States Congress. He won the election and moved to Washington, D.C., where he took his seat in the House of Representatives in January 1973.As a junior member of the House Judiciary Committee during the 1974 Watergate scandal, Cohen made headlines with his announcement that he would vote to impeach President Richard M. Nixon. He later helped pass legislation that required charges against top government officials to be investigated by an independent counsel. In 1979 he left the House for the Senate, where he was on the committee that investigated the Iran-contra affair in 1987 breaking ranks with his party, he condemned President Ronald Reagan’s involvement. Cohen took the lead in passing laws to limit lobbying and gifts to members of Congress, and he pushed for reforms to control campaign spending.
He was also active on defense and intelligence issues. He insisted that presidents could not send troops into combat without Congressional approval and was involved in reorganizing the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and cutting defense spending through procurement reform and information technology. A moderate on social issues, Cohen supported abortion rights, a five-day waiting period to buy handguns, and a bipartisan compromise health care plan. He chaired the Committee on Aging.
Cohen had many interests outside politics. He wrote poetry and mystery novels. In late 1995 he announced that he would not run for reelection to the Senate. He was married for the second time to television anchorwoman Janet Langhart on February 14, 1996. The next winter he put his retirement plans on hold to take office as Clinton’s secretary of defense.
A RINO, Cohen has generally been regarded overall as a moderate liberal.
On Donald Trump
Cohen announced in late 2016 that, similar to George H. W. Bush, he would vote for the corrupt leftist Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump. 
Cohen supported the Trump impeachment ever since May 2019,  later claiming in November that year that President Trump committed “an impeachable act”,  even ridiculously comparing the Trump administration to Nineteen Eighty-Four.