Novo

Kartagini drugi ratovi, Dexter Hoyos

Kartagini drugi ratovi, Dexter Hoyos

Kartagini drugi ratovi, Dexter Hoyos

Kartagini drugi ratovi, Dexter Hoyos

Kartaško ratovanje izvan ‘punskih ratova’ protiv Rima

Možda se većina knjiga o Kartagi neizbježno fokusira na Punske ratove, a posebno na Hanibala i Drugi punski rat. Međutim, Kartagina je postojala više od šest stoljeća i vodila je mnoge druge ratove, uključujući i neke jednako važne. Ova knjiga se bavi stoljećima ratovanja između Kartagine i njenih drugih susjeda.

Velika većina ovdje obuhvaćenih ratova vođena je na Siciliji, gdje je Kartagina dominirala zapadno od otoka, grčki gradovi su dominirali istokom, a različite grupe izvornih Sicilijanaca u dijelovima unutrašnjosti. Iako su postojali dugi periodi mira između Kartagine i Grka, kad je rat ipak došao često je bio brutalan, s velikim skupocjenim bitkama i nizom gradova ispražnjenih i uništenih. Kartažani su također vodili niz ratova protiv svojih sjevernoafričkih susjeda, ali gubitak gotovo cijele punske literature znači da o njima imamo vrlo malo detalja. Naše znanje o Sicilijanskim ratovima uvelike je pojačano djelom Diodora Sikulusa, jedne od najvažnijih antičkih istorija, a i on je porijeklom sa Sicilije.

Pomaže to što se većina velikih Kartaginih ratova dogodila prije početka Prvog punskog rata, pa odsustvo tih ratova ne stvara previše praznina u priči. Dva iznimka dogodila su se između Prvog i Drugog punskog rata - Rat bez primirja borio se protiv Kartaginih neplaćenih plaćenika i osvajanja velikih dijelova Španjolske, ali ta dva sukoba nisu bila izravno povezana s većinom ratova, a postoji kratak prikaz Prvog punskog rata na Siciliji, kojim je okončano prisustvo Kartagine na tom ostrvu.

Jedna od ključnih prednosti ove knjige je da je Kartagina sama u središtu priče, umjesto da se ispituje u smislu njenog odnosa s Rimom. Autor je takođe stručnjak za opštu istoriju Kartagine, pa imamo dobar uvid u prirodu politike u gradu. Autor je također vrlo dobar u razlikovanju različitih punskih zapovjednika, što je posebno težak zadatak u gradu u kojem je većina aristokrata barem dijelila isto nekoliko imena (Hannibal, Hamilcar, Hanno itd.).

Možda najvažnija tačka koja je proizašla iz knjige je da Kartagina nije bila toliko ratoborna, posebno u poređenju sa Grcima sa Sicilije, koji su izgleda dijelili tendenciju kopnene Grčke da međusobno ratuju. Kartažani nisu bili odgovorni za mnoge njihove ratove na Siciliji, koje su im često nametali mnogi ambiciozni tirani u Sirakuzi.

Ovo je vrlo koristan pogled na ostatak punske vojne povijesti, daleko od vrlo dobro proučenih punskih ratova, i dobrodošao dodatak mojoj biblioteci!

Poglavlja
1 - Izvori znanja
2 - Kartagina: grad i država
3 - Flote i vojske
4 - Rani ratovi: Malchus do 'kralja' Hamilcara
5 - Osveta Hanibala Magonida
6 - Kartagina protiv Dionizija i Sirakuze
7 - Kartagina protiv Timoleona
8 - Kartagina protiv Agatokla
9 - Zastoj na Siciliji: Pyrhys i Hiero
10 - Kartagina u ratu u Africi i Španiji

Autor: Dexter Hoyos
Izdanje: Tvrdi uvez
Stranice: 256
Izdavač: Pen & Sword Military
Godina: 2019



Carthage 's Other Wars

Kartagina je bila prva velesila zapadnog Mediterana, mnogo prije Rima, a njena vojna istorija bila je moćna, bogata događajima i kockasta čak i prije njenih „punskih ratova“ protiv Rima. Iako je u sačuvanim izvorima i modernim studijama okarakterizirana kao pretežno trgovačka država, Kartagina je vodila mnoge ratove, agresivne i obrambene, prije i između natjecanja s rimskim parvenusom. Grčke države Sicilija, prije svega Sirakuza pod njenim tiranima Dionisijem Velikim, a zatim i Agatokleom, bile su njeni najodlučniji protivnici, ali u samoj Sjevernoj Africi, na Sardiniji, a kasnije i u Španjolskoj pobijedila je - a ponekad i izgubila - u velikim ratovima. Ovo je prva cjelovita studija posvećena ovim drugim ratovima koja je jačala interese Kartagine više od pola milenija. Knjiga se čvrsto i analitički temelji na starim izvorima, a među mnogim spoznajama je i to da se Kartagina, iako se obično smatra pomorskom silom, više borila na kopnu nego na moru i s više uspjeha.

Kartagina je bila prva velesila zapadnog Mediterana, mnogo prije Rima, a njena vojna istorija bila je moćna, bogata događajima i kockasta čak i prije njenih „punskih ratova“ protiv Rima. Iako.

Zatvori

Ostali Kartagini ratovi: kartažansko ratovanje izvan 'punskih ratova' protiv Rima

Odličan pregled drevne pisane istorije Kartagine pre Punskih ratova sa Rimom. Iako ovoj priči mnogo nedostaje, mnogo se toga može zaključiti na način Hansa Delbrucka. Različite bitke i ratovi na Siciliji zauzimaju najveći dio knjige, a tu se ima što uživati.

Najzanimljiviji zaključak je da Kartagina nije bila ni blizu pomorske sile na koju većina misli. Umjesto toga, njegova je povijest uglavnom kopnena bitka s generalima prije Hanibala u najboljem slučaju prosječnim. Ako izvrsno pregledate drevnu pisanu povijest Kartagine prije Punskih ratova s ​​Rimom. Iako ovoj priči mnogo nedostaje, mnogo se toga može zaključiti na način Hansa Delbrucka. Različite bitke i ratovi na Siciliji zauzimaju najveći dio knjige, a tu se ima što uživati.

Najzanimljiviji zaključak je da Kartagina nije bila ni blizu pomorske sile na koju većina misli. Umjesto toga, njegova je povijest uglavnom kopnena bitka s generalima prije Hanibala u najboljem slučaju prosječnim. Ako uživate u drevnoj povijesti, ovo je djelo koje morate pročitati. . više


Izvori znanja

Pisani izvještaji o Kartaginim ratovima dolaze gotovo u potpunosti od grčkih i rimskih autora: ne zato što Kartažani nisu uspjeli voditi evidenciju, već zato što je ostalo vrlo malo od onoga što su napisali. Arheološki nalazi i natpisi na punskom jeziku bacaju svjetlo na grad i njegove ljude, ali samo malo na njegove ratove ili politiku: na primjer fragmentarni tekst ugovora iz 406. godine prije Krista s Atenom. Kao rezultat toga, ovisimo o izvještajima, često kratkim ili aluzivnim, drevnih autora od Herodota pa nadalje kada se njihova tema bavi Kartaginjanima koji se uključuju u sicilijanske ili rimske poslove. Većina je pisala mnogo kasnije, oslanjajući se na prethodne (i sada izgubljene) izvore.

1. Kartaški ostaci

Najduži kartagenski tekst koji imamo je tri stranice Periplus (putovanje morem) ‘Hannoa, kralja Kartažana’, koje je započelo kao natpis u jednom od velikih gradskih hramova. U grčkom prijevodu, vjerojatno sažetom, zabilježena je velika ekspedicija kroz Gibraltarski tjesnac i niz zapadnu obalu Afrike, naseljavajući koloniste na različita mjesta, a zatim istražujući južnije. Putovanje se vjerovatno dogodilo između 500. i 450. godine prije nove ere, kada je Kartagina proširila svoj doseg prema zapadu. Tko je bio "kralj Hanno", zašto je njegova ekspedicija poslana, gdje su mu smještene kolonije i koliko je južnije plovila flota, pitanja su koja se stalno raspravljaju.¹

Još kraći grčki tekst, na oštećenom papirusu, donosi fragment iz istorije hanibalskog rata jednog od bliskih prijatelja tog generala, Sosila iz Sparte. Pripovijedajući pomorsku bitku-zajedničku rimsku i masilsku flotu nasuprot kartažanskoj-Sosil spominje jedini spominjani navodno omiljeni pomorski manevar Kartaginjana, nazvan diekplous na grčkom. Massilia (Massalia na grčkom, danas Marseilles) bio je procvat grčkog grada koji je dugo bio u savezu s Rimom. Sosylus izvještava da se masilijanska eskadrila suprotstavlja diekplous, ali fragment ne bilježi mjesto odigravanja bitke niti bilo šta od njenih brojeva ili zapovjednika.

Dva sačuvana natpisa na punskom jeziku, jeziku Kartažana, spominju povijesne događaje - o kojima se raspravlja jer se Punić ne razumije u potpunosti iako je potomak Feničana. Jedan, vrlo nepotpun, u spomen na vojnu ekspediciju na Siciliju 406. godine prije nove ere koji je zauzeo veliki grčki grad Acragas, drugi je uglavnom sačuvan i bilježi kako je jedna ulica, očigledno velika, izgrađena od središnje Kartagine do 'novih vrata' do nekoliko imenovanih službenika, naizgled u četvrtom ili trećem stoljeću.

Nekoliko preživjelih grčkih natpisa također pruža korisne informacije. Oštećeni jedan od 406. pne bilježi savez Kartagine i Atine (jasno a pro forma obveznica). Druga, nasuprot tome, prikazuje Atenjane, samo desetak godina kasnije, kako laskaju nadom na Kartagininog neprijatelja Dionizija iz Sirakuze. Duga hronološka tablica iz trećeg stoljeća prije nove ere nazvana pariškim mramorom, od kojih su dva velika dijela preživjela, navodi odabrane događaje u grčkom svijetu između 400. i 298. godine, od kojih se neki tiču ​​Sicilije. Kratki su podaci u svim ovim dokumentima, ali oni imaju veliku vrijednost kao savremeni ili blizu savremeni izvori, dok gotovo svi naši drugi pisani dokazi dolaze od kasnijih doušnika.²

Malo Punske Kartagine ostalo je na tlu. Iako je rimska pljačka grada 146. godine prije Krista ipak ostavila hramove usred ruševina (koje, usput rečeno, nisu bile usoljene), novi rimski grad koji su osnovali Julije Cezar i August gotovo je u potpunosti zamijenio stare ostatke, s vremenom, novim strukturama poput velikog kupatila Antonine Baths pored obale. Veliki Ešmunov hram, kojeg su Rimljani poistovjetili s Eskulapom, koji je stajao na brdu citadele u Byrsi, uklonjen je-zajedno sa cijelom gornjom površinom Byrsa-u korist Rimskog i Augustovog hrama, koji je 1890. godine postao hram Katedrala Svetog Luja (sada Acropolium).

Savremeni arheološki radovi na dostupnim nalazištima otkrili su, međutim, neke značajne karakteristike punskog grada, prije svega o dječjem groblju o kojem se mnogo raspravljalo (konvencionalno nazvano tophet, riječ Starog zavjeta), obližnje zatvorene luke-jedna pravokutna, jedna kružna-koje je opisao grčki povjesničar Apian, te sektor na južnoj padini Byrse koji je razvijen kao suvremena stambena i poslovna četvrt oko 200-190 pne. Ovo i luke datiraju iz perioda Punskih ratova, dok je tophet nalazi su uglavnom nedodirljivi. Materijalni dokazi iz doba ratova u Kartagi sastoje se uglavnom od predmeta za vjersku, komercijalnu ili svakodnevnu upotrebu, zajedno s kovanicama udarenim od četvrtog stoljeća za plaćanje vojske na Siciliji. Većina preživjelih punskih tekstova nalazi se na zavjetnim predmetima koji su jednom deponirani na grobljima ili u hramovima, sa imenima umrle osobe ili osoba i obično njihovim životnim zanimanjima da su bili punoljetni (svećenik, svećenica, stolar, majstor lukova, kočijaš). Iako nisu bliski podacima, oni bacaju svjetlo na društveni i ekonomski sastav Kartagine kroz stoljeća. Međutim, vojne informacije su tanke. Za priču o drugim Kartaginim ratovima i njihovom utjecaju na kartaginski život i politiku, oslanjamo se uglavnom na pisane i nepunske izvore.³

2. Grčki i latinski zapisi

Najraniji grčki povjesničar, Periklov savremeni Herodot iz Halikarnasa, imao je mnogo toga da kaže o Kartaginim radnjama u šestom i petom vijeku, uključujući putovanja po Atlantiku (iako to nije bila Hanova ekspedicija) i, prije svega, prvi veliki sukob Kartagine sa sicilijanskim Grcima iste godine kada je Kserks napao Grčku. Herodot je mnogo putovao po istočnom Mediteranu kako bi prikupio materijale za svojih sedam knjiga Histories, napisan 440 -ih - prvo djelo koje je nosilo to ime, na grčkom za „upite“ - a Kartažani su bili među njegovim doušnicima. Smatrao je da je Kartagina zanimljiva i, implicitno, ne previše različita od grčkih država kao trgovačka i vojna sila.

Stoljeće nakon Herodota, filozof Aristotel doveo je Kartagine političke strukture u svoju Politika, jedina ne-grčka država u djelu. Njegovi različiti komentari ne predstavljaju ništa više od impresionističke skice: "kraljevi" (basileis) odabrao je, na način koji nije naveden, od uglednih porodica „senat“ (gerousia) jednako neodređenih porijekla „odbora od pet“ (pentarchiai) koji ima vrlo široka ovlaštenja i - zagonetno - izvršava ih čak i prije obnašanja dužnosti, a nakon nje i visokog vijeća od "Sto četiri" čije su funkcije neprozirne i ljudi (demos), ponekad konsultovan, a ponekad ne. Ipak Politika daje više informacija o tome kako se upravljalo Kartaginom od svih ostalih izvora zajedno.

Ono što znamo o njegovim ratovima prije 264. uglavnom je zahvaljujući Diodoru Sicilijskom Historijska biblioteka, napisano u doba Julija Cezara. Od ove povijesti mediteranskog svijeta do Diodorusovog života (koliko je taj svijet bio poznat Grcima), samo su knjige 1–5 i 11–20 preživjele potpune, iako odlomci iz Biblioteka nastale u vizantijsko doba čuvaju dio sadržaja izgubljenih knjiga. Diodorusovi glavni interesi bili su ratovi u Grčkoj i na Siciliji. Njihova karirana istorija između 480. i 301. godine ispričana je u knjigama 11-20 (sa povremenim spominjanjima Rima), a njegova istorijska metoda bila je da konsultuje i saže mali broj ranijih istorija - ponekad samo jednu - za dati period i regiju. On je samo povremeno favorizirao svoje čitatelje imenom izvora koje je koristio.

Diodorusovi glavni autoritet za Kartagine odnose sa Sicilijom bili su Grci: Efor iz četvrtog stoljeća, čija je veoma velika istorija Grčke sve do njegovog vremena uključivala izvještaje o Grcima Sicilije (Sicelioti) i Italije, te dugovječni Sicilijanski Timej 'ambicioznu povijest tog otoka i njegove odnose s drugim zemljama i narodima, među kojima su bili i Kartažani. Mora da su se Efor i Timej i sami oslanjali na ranije pisce, poput Antioha iz Sirakuze (vjerovatno prvog istoričara Sicilije i Italije, oko 420. godine prije nove ere) i Filista-saveznika, kasnijeg bivšeg prijatelja Dionisija starijeg, tiranina (to jest, diktatora) Sirakuze od 405. do 367. - koji je u izgnanstvu napisao istoriju Sicilije, a posebno Dionizijevog udjela u njoj.

Diodor je nejednako izvještavao o zapadnim događajima. On je detaljno pisao o Kartaginoj invaziji na Siciliju 480. godine, njenim kasnijim kampanjama od 409. i prvoj polovici Dionizijeve duge vladavine (do 387.), zatim o sicilijanskim ratovima sredinom četvrtog stoljeća (350. do 330. godine) i prije svega spektakularne, ubilačke i paradoksalne preokrete na Siciliji i u sjevernoj Africi u doba Agatokla iz Sirakuze (u rasponu od 320 -ih do 306). Nasuprot tome, većinu sicilijanske povijesti petog stoljeća on je slabo zabilježio, pa je tako i Dionizijeve posljednje decenije možda prognani Filist izgubio dio interesa. Budući da je 20. knjiga posljednja cjelovita knjiga koja je preživjela, kasniji sicilijanski i kartaginjanski događaji pojavljuju se samo u izvodima nastalim 1.000 godina kasnije u vizantijsko doba.

Ciceronov prijatelj, Cornelius Nepos, sastavio je skicirane biografije dvadeset dva 'slavna strana generala' uključujući Diona, oslobodioca Sirakuze od sina i Dionisijevog nasljednika 350-ih godina i Timoleona iz Korinta koji je, dvadeset godina nakon Diona, oslobodio Grčku Siciliju od svih njegovih raznih tirana i od kartažanske dominacije. Vrlo kratko (Dion uzima 10 odlomaka, Timoleon pet) i nužno pojednostavljeni, skice ne dodaju mnogo potpunijim zapisima Diodora i grčkog filozofa-esejiste Plutarha. Još je kraći (tri paragrafa) njegov rezime o Kartagininom graditelju carstva iz trećeg stoljeća Hamilkaru Barci, ocu njenog najpoznatijeg generala Hanibala.

Još jedan Diodorusov savremenik, Pompeius Trogus, učeni Rimljanin iz južne Galije, napisao je vlastitu kvazi-svjetsku istoriju u četrdeset četiri knjige pod nazivom Philippic Histories. Ovo je preživjelo rimsko doba samo u kasnijoj skraćenoj verziji jednog Justina i u zasebnom, kratkom popisu sadržaja pod nazivom Prolozi. Justinova Epitome Trogusa postala je jedna od najpopularnijih latinskih knjiga srednjeg vijeka. Neobično što je Rimu posvećivao oskudnu pažnju, Trogus se usredsredio na grčke, makedonske i helenističke poslove, a takođe je dao i zapažen prikaz o poreklu Kartagine. Poput Diodora, tada je spominjao Kartagu uglavnom kada je pripovijedao o endemskim ratovima na Siciliji. U isto vrijeme, on (ili njegov epitomator) mogao je napraviti čudne greške: u jednom trenutku Epitome nudi „Leonidu, bratu spartanskog kralja“, koji zapovijeda otporom sicilijanskih Grka Kartagini oko 490. godine, što je očito nemoguće (vidi Poglavlje 4 ispod). Stoga se Justin mora koristiti oprezno.

Oko 100. godine poslije Krista, grčki filozof-esejist Plutarh doprinio je onome što znamo o umiješanosti Kartagine na Siciliji između 360. i 270. godine prije nove ere, sa tri biografije u svojoj Paralelni životi serija. Jedan se bavi Dionom, drugi Timoleonom, a treći Pirom, čiji je buran život (koji je uglavnom proveo izvan njegovog kralja Epira) uključivao ekspediciju 278–76 da povede Siceliote protiv kartaških napada. Plutarhov fokus su grčki i rimski, događaji se rijetko vide sa Kartagine. No, slijedio je suvremene ili gotovo suvremene izvore, poput pisama Dionu s Platona, istoriju jednog sirakuzanskog prijatelja Dionovog imena Athanis ili Atanasa, te Efora i Timeja (sve ih, obično, spominje samo s vremena na vrijeme).

Drugi su pisci povremeno imali šta reći o Kartagini prije njenih rimskih ratova. Platonova pisma Dionu (Poslanice 7 i 8) su vjerovatno autentični i raspravljaju uglavnom o sicilijanskoj politici i filozofskim načelima. Polibije, grčki posmatrač iz drugog stoljeća prije Krista, sudionik i povjesničar mediteranskih događaja tokom uspona Rima, dominirao je prevedenim tekstovima prvih Kartaginih ugovora s Rimom-općenito datiranim 509., 348. (ili 306.) i 279./78. teme su se bavile trgovinom na zapadno -sicilijanskim teritorijama Kartagine. Napisao je i jezgrovit izvještaj o ‘Ratu bez primirja’ 241–37, kada se Kartagina približila propasti od strane svojih pobunjeničkih plaćenika i libijskih podanika (njegova pripovijest je indirektno inspirirala poznati roman Gustava Flauberta Salammbô). Polibije je zabilježio ovaj rat, jedan od rijetkih koji se vodio u Kartagi, a koji nije uključivao grčku Siciliju ili Rim, dijelom kako bi podsjetio svoje helenističke grčke čitatelje koliko je opasno zapošljavati, a zatim ne plaćati profesionalne trupe, dijelom i da ilustrira moralne razlike u tome kako civilizirane države poput Kartagine i necivilizirane horde poput pobunjenika ponašale su se pod ekstremnim stresom, a djelomično da objasne zašto se Kartagina dvadeset godina kasnije našla u drugom ratu s Rimom.

Raštrkane informacije i dezinformacije javljaju se u drugim grčkim i latinskim djelima. Plautova komedija Poenulus, "Mali Kartaginjac"-farsa koja se ne razbija i prikazuje posrnulog punskog trgovca-postavljena je manje od deset godina nakon završetka Hanibalovog rata. Kako su Kartagina i njen bogati grčki susjed Kirena popravili svoju zajedničku granicu negdje u šestom stoljeću (u polulegendarnoj verziji) ispričao je Sallust, prvi namjesnik novopripajene Numidije Julija Cezara. Prilično kratak pregled predrimske Kartagine i njenih teritorija u Libiji (danas sjeverna polovica Tunisa) dao je augustovski grčki Strabon u svom Geografija. Nešto se zna o punskoj poljoprivredi i upravljanju imanjem jer je enciklopedija o poljoprivredi koju je cijenio jedan Mago bila dvadeset osam knjiga, bila je među izvorima koje je koristio rimski agronom Columella koji je pisao oko 60. godine.

Anegdote iz kartažanske povijesti-koje nisu uvijek vjerovatne-uključivali su autori prenoseći priče o prošlim poznatim ličnostima ili vojnim stratištima, poput zbirke Valerija Maksima iz ranog prvog vijeka nove ere Poznata djela i izreke u devet knjiga (još jedan srednjovjekovni favorit) i kompilacijama vojske Stratagems koju su napisali rimski Frontinus oko 100. godine nove ere i grčki Polyaenus šezdeset godina kasnije. Raštrkane, i ne uvijek točne, stavke o Kartagi osim rimskih ratova mogu se pronaći u mnogim drugim autorima, poput Polianovog savremenog Apiksa u Aleksandriji, povjesničara iz trećeg stoljeća naše ere Kasija Dija i njegovog bizantskog epitomatora Zonarasa, pa čak i sv. Augustinov prijatelj Orozije u svojoj istoriji predhrišćanskih svjetskih katastrofa.

Klasični pisci nisu imali jednoličan, a još manje jednolično neprijateljski stav o Kartagini. Plautov ‘mali Kartaginjanin’ Hanno je nezastrašujuće nesretni stariji trgovac koji pokušava pronaći svoje otete kćeri, i PoenulusZaljubljeni junak zgodan je mladi Kartaginjanin (iako s grčkim imenom). Ozbiljnije, razni su autori spominjali Kartagine navodne obrede žrtvovanja djece, ponekad sa živopisnim detaljima i prikladnim gađenjem (posebno Diodor i Plutarh - ali ne i Herodot, Aristotel, Polibije, Strabon ili Apijan). Plutarh je, također, napisao oštar i mnogo citiran prijekor starih Kartažana u jednom od svojih filozofskih eseja: "oni su ogorčeni, mrzovoljni i podređeni svojim sudijama", napisao je, praveći direktan kontrast sa svojom slikom vrlih i veseli ljudi iz Atine.

Ipak, stavke i gađenje ne prožimaju šire drevne izvještaje o kartaginskim događajima, društvu i ličnostima. Herodot je bio zaintrigiran punskim pomorskim pothvatima i impresioniran Hamilkarom, vođom ekspedicije na Siciliju 480., također nam govori da je Hamilkarova majka bila gospođa iz Sirakuze i da je Gelon, vođa Sirakuze koji ga je pobijedio, imao ženu vrlo dobro raspoloženu do Kartagine. Aristotel je politički sistem Kartaginjana stavio u ravan s onima mnogih grčkih država. Katon Cenzor se divio Hamilkaru Barci (poznatom Hanibalovom ocu) isto koliko i Periklu i Temistoklu. Svi su znali da Kartagina i njeni ljudi imaju više od pojma, još uvijek popularnog, mračnog istočnjačkog društva koje krpi novac.

Kartagina: grad i država

1. Temelj i trag

Kartagina je bila trgovački grad. Smješten na malom poluotoku u Tuniskom zaljevu, sa sjeverne strane čuvan širokim rtom zvanim Megara i iz zaliva ga promatra mnogo veći poluotok Cape Bon, grad je ležao gotovo točno na pola puta duž dugačke pomorske rute između pradomovina Fenikija i Gibraltarski tjesnac. Iako nije najstarija kolonija koju su osnovali Feničani (Gades u jugozapadnoj Španiji tvrdio je da je to čast), Kartaga je u nekoliko stoljeća postala najbogatija i najmnogoljudnija od svih njihovih kolonija, s komercijalnim i vjerskim vezama koje su prelazile cijeli Mediteran. To je neizbježno značilo udaranje sa susjedima i rivalima.

Sicilijanski grčki povjesničar Timaj datirao je osnivanje na 'trideset osmu godinu prije prve olimpijade'-dakle 814/13-prema autoru iz augustovskog doba Dionisiju iz Halikarnasa: to nije datum koji se uzima samo na povjerenje, i za Timeja datiran u Rim iste godine (šest decenija ranije od bilo koga drugog). Međutim, arheološki nalazi doveli su osnivanje Kartagine u drugi dio devetog stoljeća, nasuprot pretpostavljenim kasnijim datumima. Tradicionalna priča o gradu je poznata: kada je Dido, princeza od Tira, pobjegla u Sjevernu Afriku kako bi pobjegla od svog ubojitog kraljevskog brata Pigmaliona, lokalni Libijci su dozvolili njoj i njenim sljedbenicima da osnuju naselje na brdu Byrsa na poluotoku koje su nazvali Novi grad , Qart-Hadascht. Dido se kasnije ubila, umjesto da bude prisiljena da se vjenča, pa je stoga postala vazal susjednog libijskog kralja - ili u Vergilijevu hronološki mješovitom prepričavanju, nakon što ju je zaveo i napustio lutajući trojanski knez Eneja, predak osnivača Rima Romula i Rema.

Iako se općenito smatra da je samo mit, srž priče donosi nam osnivačicu - vrlo rijetku stavku u drevnim pričama o temeljima - koja bježi od tirskog kralja po imenu Pygmalion, prvo na Kipar radi pomoći, a zatim u Sjevernu Afriku. 'Dido' je bio epitet koji joj je opet dao Timej: njeno alternativno ime u pričama je Elissa, najvjerovatnije Feničanka Elishat, 'žena Kipra' (feničansko ime tog ostrva bilo je Alashiya). Pigmalion iz Tira je bio stvaran. Svojim je gradom vladao od 831. do 785.-ili 820.-74. godine prema drugom računanju-i zlatni privjesak pronađen u blizini brda Byrsa očito ga i naziva: u feničanskim natpisima iz devetog stoljeća njegova legenda pozdravlja božicu Astarte, a također i Pigmalion, te njegovog vlasnika Yadomilk, Pidijin sin, izjavljuje da je Pigmalion (Pgmlyn) „Naoružali ga“ ili „spasili“. To ne pokazuje da je Pigmalion bio pravi osnivač Kartagine. Elissa/ Dido pratili su mnogi vodeći Tirci (među njima je Livy napisao u izgubljenoj knjizi, admiral 'Bitias', u feničanskoj Pidiji), a čvrsti zlatni ukras trebao je biti cijenjen - i ostavljen potomcima - čak i ako je njegov vlasnik napustio je svog starog vladara radi novog.¹

'Novi grad' bilo je funkcionalno ime. Bilo je i drugih među feničanskim mediteranskim naseljima-jedno na Kipru, drugo na Sardiniji, pa čak i jedno 80 km jugozapadno od Kartagine: Grci i Rimljani zvali su ga Neapolis, što znači isto (moderni Nabeul u zaljevu Hamamet). Kad je 228. godine prije Krista slavni Hanibalov zet Hasdrubal osnovao svoj grad u južnoj Španjolskoj, dao bi mu upravo to ime, čak i da su ga radi jasnoće Rimljani nazvali Nova Kartagina (danas, Cartagena).

Elisin grad počeo je prilično mali. Od Byrsa prema istoku do obale, samo pola kilometra od brda citadele prema sjeveru, luk drugih niskih brežuljaka, koji se postupno uzdizao do visoke i široke visoravni Megare (danas La Marsa i Gammarth), koristio se za brojna groblja. Veći dio same Megare kasnije je postao ljupko obrađeno prostranstvo vrtova, voćnjaka i udobnih seoskih vila, a gradska odbrana proširena je samo stoljećima kasnije.

Južno od Byrsa, ravan močvarni teren širio se do ruba jezera Tunis, širokog ulaza sa uskim ulazom izvana u Zaljev. Kanal koji je vodio od jezera do južne strane Kartagine iskopan je, vjerojatno u četvrtom stoljeću, kako bi trgovački brodovi mogli veslati do pristaništa kako bi isporučili i preuzeli robu - svjedočanstvo o velikom bogatstvu i trgovini grada do tada . Čuvene skrivene luke Kartagine, koje su još vidljive odmah uz istočnu obalu, došle su kasnije. Kako su prosperitet i broj stanovnika rasli, tako su se povećavali i veličina i pogodnosti Kartagine. Istočna obala stekla je ogromna utvrđenja tokom petog stoljeća, velika skladišta i rezidencije ispunile su urbano područje, a Megara je razvila svoje vile i voćnjake.

Byrsa je držala veliki hram posvećen bogu Ešmunu, kojeg su Grci i Rimljani izjednačili sa svojim bogom iscjeljenjem Asklepijem/Eskulapom. Do nje se stizalo širokim stubištem od šezdeset stepenica, snažno utvrđeno, i bit će vidljivo izdaleka poput njegovog sadašnjeg nasljednika Akropolija. Ispod njega i blizu morskih zidina stajao je hram Reshefa, feničko-punskog boga poistovjećenog s Apolonom. Ovo je u potpunosti prekriveno zlatnim listovima - Apijan je izvijestio kako su rimski vojnici koji su opljačkali Kartaginu 146. pne hakirali tako strašno da su neki čak izgubili ruku u ludilu. Ostala kartažanska božanstva, posebno Baal Hamon, njegov supružnik Tanit (na mnogim natpisima nazvan "Tanitovo lice Baala"), Tyrov Melqart i Astarte te egipatska Izida također će imati hramove. 396. godine božice zaštitnice grčke Sicilije Demetra i Kore-Persefona također su dobile svetište u gradu kako bi spriječile kugu koja je vraćena sa Sicilije. Rimljani bi sve uništili, bilo u vreći ili kasnije. Kao što je ranije spomenuto, kada je August ponovno osnovao grad kao rimsku koloniju, čak mu je dao obrijati cijeli vrh Birse kako bi se smjestio novi hram za rimske bogove.

Kartaška kultura od ranih vremena bila je podjednako otvorena stranim utjecajima. Grobna roba i druga nalazišta uključuju statuete, reljefe na kamenu, minijaturna svetišta i hramove, ukrase i skulpture prema egipatskim i grčkim uzorima. Kad su počeli kovati novčići, krajem petog stoljeća, posuđivali su motive-a možda i majstore kovnice novca-sa grčke Sicilije i istočnogrčkog svijeta. Jedan od najljepših nalaza iz predrimske sjeverne Afrike je dvodijelni set brončanog oklopa, datiran vjerojatno iz trećeg stoljeća: jedan oklop za grudi i jedan za leđa, plus prateće naramenice, sve složeno utisnuto glave gorgona i životinja i cvjetni motivi. Pronađen na selu u blizini Hadrumetuma (Sousse) i zasigurno namijenjen za ceremonijalnu upotrebu, a ne za borbu, od strane bogatog oficira, šareno odražava stilove južnotalijanske grčke umjetnosti, a podsjeća i na izvlačenje raskošne kartažanske opreme koja je 341. godine Timoleonovim trupama oduzela dva dana prikupiti nakon njihove pobjede na Siciliji na Krimisu.²

Iako su Elissa/Dido i njeni sljedbenici bili Feničani iz Tira, a Kartažani su uvijek bili u bliskim vezama sa svojim gradom-majkom, uvriježeno mišljenje da su ostali duboko bliskoistočni ljudi i kultura je pogrešno. Kad je Dionizij, sirakuški tiranin, planirao rat protiv Kartagine 398. godine, izvršio je ogromne pripreme jer je, vrijedno potvrđen Diodorusov izvor, znao da je "ulazio u borbu s najmoćnijim ljudima Europe" - a ne Azije ili Afrike. Za Grke, Kartagina je bila daleko od vanzemaljske (iako ne i bliske) kulture, na koju je do tada njihov utjecaj uvelike utjecao.

Najmanje jednom, oko 362., zatekli smo delegaciju Kartažana koja je putovala u Delfe kako bi se tamo posavjetovala s Pitijskim proročištem. Ni grad-država nije mogao porasti u broju stanovnika samo kroz stalni tok feničkih migranata kroz stoljeća (za to nema dokaza). Natpisi i literarni izvori otkrivaju Kartažane povezane sa vanjskim svijetom i doseljenike odatle u Kartaginu. Gore je spomenuto da je Hamilkar, mračni zapovjednik sicilijanske ekspedicije 480., imao majku iz Sirakuze, a Sirakuzanac Dion koji je 357. godine oslobodio svoj grad od tiranije imao je kartažinskog gosta-prijatelja, 'Sinalus'-što je grčki za Eshmunhalos-koji pomogao mu je u ključnoj ranoj fazi njegovog poduhvata. Dion je zapravo imao brojne kontakte u Kartagi, što ga je na kraju dovelo u nevolje. Kasnije su dva preduzetnička punska oficira zaposlena na Siciliji oko 212–11 bili unuci vojnika iz Siracusa koji su se nastanili u Kartagini i čak nosili grčka imena, Hipokrat i Epicid.³

Diodor je potvrdio da su Kartažani mogli legalno oženiti supružnike iz drugih feničkih kolonija. Jedva da se može sumnjati da su se i oni vjenčali sa suprugama ili muževima iz libijskih zajednica - legalno ili ne. Oni su zasigurno uspostavili bračne veze s narodima zapadnije, kako to prikazuje porodica Hamilcara Barce od 240. Dao je, ili obećao, kćer regionalnom numidijanskom gospodaru Naravasu kao nagradu za njegovu oružanu podršku, jedna od njegovih unuka se kasnije redom udala za dva kraljevska rođaka Naravasa. U 220-im godinama, i Hamilkarov zet i njegov poznati sin, Hanibal, vjenčali su se sa suprugama Španjolkama. Još poznatije, Naravasov rođak Masinissa nakratko se vjenčao s lijepom mladom kartaginjanskom aristokratkinjom Sophonibom 203. godine - otimajući je od svoje pale suparnice Syphax - prije nego što ju je likvidirao po nalogu svog novog pokrovitelja Scipiona Africanusa. U oštroj istoriji


Thomo's Hole

Dexter Hoyos has taken a look at something that has very poor coverage, namely Carthage’s Other Wars. We are all aware of the Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome and to a lesser extent, Carthage’s attempts to expand into Sicily and the conflict that arose with Syracuse among others.

The popular image of Carthage is as a maritime, mercantile state that fought a couple of wars against Rome, eventually losing and setting Rome up to to be the only major power in the Mediterranean.

Carthage’s Other Wars – Carthaginian Warfare Outside the ‘Punic Wars’ Against Rome written by Dexter Hoyos (published by Pen & Sword Military, on 18 September 2019, ISBN: 9781781593578 and 235 pages long) sets out to look at Carthage’s other wars.

According to Timaeus the Sicilian Greek, Carthage was founded in the 38th year prior to the first Olympiad, which in modern terms dates the foundation around 814/13 BC. The city was, according to legend, founded by Dido, who was fleeing from the Tyrian King, Pygmalion. She travelled through Cyprus then on to North Africa. Her alternative name in the stories of the time is Elissa.

While there is not a great deal of Carthaginian text, with the exception of Hanno’s Periplus (sea voyage) in Greek translation and referring to the journey west of the Strait of Gibraltar and down Africa’s West coast, there is information in other sources and Hoyos refers to Herodotus, Aristotle, Diodorus of Sicily who referenced Ephorus, Timaeus of Sicily and Philistus. Pompeius Trogus wrote a history that survived to later times and was abbreviated in Justin’s works. Plutarch provided information on Carthage’s involvement in Sicily and Polybius translated Carthaginian texts of Carthage’s treaties with Rome.

The contents of the book are:

  1. Sources of Knowledge
    1. Carthaginian remnants
    2. Greek and Latin Records
    1. Foundation and footprint
    2. The Carthaginian republic
    3. Trade and business
    4. Merchants, landowners, commoners and slaves
    5. Friends, neighbours and potential foes
    1. Carthage’s navy
    2. Vojska
    3. The defences of Carthage
    1. Malchus: fiction or fact?
    2. Malchus: victories, revenge and ruin
    3. The Magonids: ’empire’ builders?
    4. The expedition of ‘king’ Hamilcar
    1. The aftermath of Himera
    2. A new Sicilian war: the first expedition of Hannibal the Magonid
    3. Carthage victorious, 406-05 BC
    1. Uneasy peace, 405-398
    2. Himilco vs Dionysius
    3. Mago vs Dionysius
    4. Mago and Himilco against Dionysius
    5. Last war with Dionysius
    1. Carthage and the turmoils of Sicily
    2. The arrival of Timoleon
    3. Sorting out sources
    4. The enigma of Mago
    5. The battle at the Crimisus
    6. Gisco and peace
    1. The advent of Agathocles
    2. Agathocles frustrating Carthage
    3. Carthage at war with Agathocles
    4. Africa invaded
    5. The destruction of Hamilcar
    6. The destruction of Ophellas and Bomilcar
    7. Agathocles fails in Africa, wins in Sicily
    8. The end of the war
    1. The woes of post-Agathoclean Sicily
    2. The war with Pyrrhus
    3. Hiero of Syracuse
    1. Libya: subjects and rebels
    2. The Truceless War: origins and outbreak
    3. Horrors of the Truceless War
    4. Carthage’s victory
    5. Barcid Carthage’s Spanish empire

    There is also a Concluding Chapter, List of Plates, Maps, Preface and Acknowledgements, Abbreviations and Reading, along with Endnotes and Index.

    The writing style of Hoyos is quite easy to read and flows well. He examines the sources and secondary readings critically and well, although I did have some trouble locating some of his references (for example, Connolly (1981) is referenced in Carthage’s Navy’s endnotes but there is no reference to his works in the reading list (I could reasonably guess that we are referring to Connolly, Peter (1981), Greece and Rome at War, Macdonald Phoebus Ltd).

    Having said that, the book is a solid piece of research into a little covered area of Carthaginian history. I have had an interest in Carthage since the mid-1970s but most of my previous reading was around the Punic Wars. This has opened an entire other area of interest to me in Carthaginian History.

    Best of all, the book is currently on special at Pen and Sword – and it is well recommended.


    Sadržaj

    The main source for almost every aspect of the Punic Wars [note 1] is the historian Polybius (c. 200 – c. 118 BC ), a Greek sent to Rome in 167 BC as a hostage. [2] His works include a now-lost manual on military tactics, [3] but he is now known for The Histories, written sometime after 146 BC. [4] [5] The modern consensus is to accept Polybius's accounts largely at face value, and the details of the war in modern sources are largely based on interpretations of Polybius. [2] [6] [7]

    Polybius's account of the Battle of Ibera has not survived, and his record of the preceding campaigns in Iberia is very fragmentary. Livy, who relied heavily on Polybius, [8] is the other major source for this battle and the events preceding it. [9] The classicist Adrian Goldsworthy considers Livy's "reliability is often suspect", especially with regard to his descriptions of battles, [note 2] [11] and he is generally considered untrustworthy by modern historians. [note 3] [13] [8] Other sources include coins, inscriptions, and archaeological evidence. [14]

    Pre-war Edit

    The First Punic War was fought between Carthage and Rome: the two main powers of the western Mediterranean in the 3rd century BC struggled for supremacy primarily on the Mediterranean island of Sicily and its surrounding waters, and also in North Africa. [15] The war lasted for lasted for 23 years, from 264 to 241 BC, until the Carthaginians were defeated. [16] [17] The Treaty of Lutatius was signed by which Carthage evacuated Sicily and paid an indemnity of 3,200 talents [note 4] over ten years. [19] Four years later Rome seized Sardinia and Corsica on a cynical pretence and imposed a further 1,200 talent indemnity. [note 5] [20] [21] The seizure of Sardinia and Corsica by Rome and the additional indemnity fuelled resentment in Carthage. [22] [23] Polybius considered this act of bad faith by the Romans to be the single greatest cause of war with Carthage breaking out again nineteen years later. [24]

    Shortly after Rome's breach of the treaty the leading Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca led many of his veterans on an expedition to expand Carthaginian holdings in south-east Iberia (modern Spain and Portugal) this was to become a quasi-monarchial, autonomous Barcid fiefdom. [25] Carthage gained silver mines, agricultural wealth, manpower, military facilities such as shipyards and territorial depth which encouraged it to stand up to future Roman demands. [26] Hamilcar ruled as a viceroy and was succeeded by his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, in the early 220s BC and then his son, Hannibal, in 221 BC. [27] In 226 BC the Ebro Treaty was agreed, specifying the Ebro River as the northern boundary of the Carthaginian sphere of influence. [28] A little later Rome made a separate treaty with the city of Saguntum, well south of the Ebro. [29] In 219 BC a Carthaginian army under Hannibal besieged, captured and sacked Saguntum. [30] [31] In spring 218 BC Rome declared war on Carthage, starting the Second Punic War. [32]

    Carthage invades Italy Edit

    In 218 BC the Romans raised an army to campaign in Iberia under the brothers Gnaeus and Publius Scipio. The major Gallic tribes in Cisalpine Gaul (modern northern Italy) attacked the Romans, capturing several towns and ambushing a Roman army. [33] The Roman Senate detached one Roman and one allied legion from the force intended for Iberia to send to the region. The Scipios had to raise fresh troops to replace these and thus could not set out for Iberia until September. [34]

    Meanwhile, Hannibal assembled a Carthaginian army in New Carthage (modern Cartagena) and entered Gaul, taking an inland route to avoid the Roman allies along the coast. [35] Hannibal left his brother Hasdrubal Barca in charge of Carthaginian interests in Iberia. The Roman fleet carrying the Scipio brothers' army landed at Rome's ally Massalia (modern Marseille) at the mouth of the River Rhone at about the same time as Hannibal was fighting his way across the river against a force of local Allobroges at the Battle of Rhone Crossing. [36] [37] Hannibal evaded the Romans and Gnaeus Scipio continued to Iberia with the Roman army [38] [39] Publius returned to Rome. [39] The Carthaginians crossed the Alps [35] early in 217 BC, taking the Romans by surprise and causing them to cancel their main campaign planned for the year, an invasion of Africa. [40]

    Rome invades Iberia Edit

    Gnaeus Scipio continued on from Massala to Iberia, landing his army of four legions, two Roman and two allied – approximately 25,000 men – in the autumn of 218 BC at Cissa and winning support among the local tribes. [39] [38] The Carthaginian commander in the area, Hanno, refused to wait for Carthaginian reinforcements under Hasdrubal, attacked Scipio at the Battle of Cissa in late 218 BC and was defeated. [38] In 217 BC, the Carthaginians moved to engage the combined Roman and Massalian fleet at the Battle of Ebro River. In 217 BC, Hasdrubal launched a joint operation, advancing into the Roman controlled area in close cooperation with a fleet of 40 Carthaginian and Iberian quinqueremes. The naval component was defeated by 55 Roman and Massalian vessels at the Battle of Ebro River, with 29 Carthaginian ships were lost. In the aftermath the Carthaginian forces retreated, but the Romans remained confined to the area between the Ebro and Pyrenees. [39] The Roman lodgement was preventing the Carthaginians from sending reinforcements from Iberia to Hannibal or to the insurgent Gauls in northern Italy. [39]

    The Carthaginian setbacks caused some of the Iberian tribes to turn against them, notably the Turdetani in the south west. While Hasdrubal was putting down this uprising, Gnaeus Scipio received 8,000 reinforcements, under his brother Publius Scipio, in 217 BC. Hasdrubal received orders from Carthage to move into Italy and join up with Hannibal to put pressure on the Romans in their homeland. [39] [41] Hasdrubal demurred, arguing that Carthaginian authority over the Spanish tribes was too fragile for him to move out of the south west. [42] In 217 BC he received 4,500 reinforcements from Africa, and in 216 BC an entire army, although of unknown size. [43] The historian of the Punic Wars Dexter Hoyos points out this was "even though [Iberia] itself was supposed to be a reservoir of first-class fighting men." Clearly the enthusiasm for Carthage of the indigenous Iberians was suspect. [43]

    Having quelled the Turdetani, Hasdrubal left his subordinate Himilco in charge at Cartagena and marched north with his field army in early 215 BC. The Romans crossed the Ebro River in force and laid siege to Ibera (later known as Dertosa Ilercavonia, [41] modern Tortosa), a small town on the south bank of the River Ebro which was allied to Carthage. [44] [38] Hasdrubal in turn laid siege to a Roman-aligned town and the Scipios lifted their siege and moved to engage him. [44]

    Roman Edit

    Most male Roman citizens were eligible for military service and would serve as infantry, a better-off minority providing a cavalry component. Traditionally, when at war the Romans would raise two legions, each of 4,200 infantry [note 6] and 300 cavalry. Approximately 1,200 of the infantry, poorer or younger men unable to afford the armour and equipment of a standard legionary, served as javelin-armed skirmishers, known as velites. They carried several javelins, which would be thrown from a distance, a short sword, and a 90 centimetres (3.0 ft) shield. [47] The balance were equipped as heavy infantry, with body armour, a large shield and short thrusting swords. They were divided into three ranks, of which the front rank also carried two javelins, while the second and third ranks had a thrusting spear instead. Both legionary sub-units and individual legionaries fought in relatively open order. It was the long-standing Roman procedure to elect two men each year, known as consuls, to each lead an army. An army was usually formed by combining a Roman legion with a similarly sized and equipped legion provided by their Latin allies allied legions usually had a larger attached complement of cavalry than Roman ones. [48] ​​[49]

    The order of battle of the Roman army at Ibera is not known, [50] but has been estimated at around 25,000 probably made up of two Roman legions, two Italian allied legions and their associated cavalry, and reinforced by an unknown number of locally recruited Iberian infantry and cavalry. It is believed to have been about the same size as the Carthaginian army. [51]

    Carthaginian Edit

    Carthage usually recruited foreigners to make up its army. Many would be from North Africa which provided several types of fighters including: close-order heavy infantry equipped with large shields, helmets, short swords and long thrusting spears javelin-armed light infantry skirmishers close-order shock cavalry (also known as "heavy cavalry") carrying spears and light cavalry skirmishers who threw javelins from a distance and avoided close combat. [52] [53] Iberia provided large numbers of experienced infantry unarmoured troops who would charge ferociously, but had a reputation for breaking off if a combat was protracted. [54] [55] Militia would sometimes be recruited from Carthaginian populated cities and colonies, and would be equipped as the North African heavy infantry. The close order North African infantry and the citizen-militia would fight in a tightly packed formation known as a phalanx. The Libyans were usually well trained but the citizen-militia were notoriously ill-trained and ill-disciplined. [53] Slingers were frequently recruited from the Balearic Islands. [56] [57] The Carthaginians also employed war elephants North Africa had indigenous African forest elephants at the time. [note 7] [55] [59] The sources are not clear as to whether they carried towers containing fighting men. [60]

    The order of battle of the Carthaginian army at Ibera is not known in detail, [50] but has been estimated at around 25,000 and is believed to have been about the same size as the Roman army. [51] The Carthaginian army also had a small number of war elephants, perhaps the 21 which Hannibal left in Iberia when he set out for Italy in 218 BC. [50]

    Deployment Edit

    Formal battles were usually preceded by the two armies camping one to seven miles apart (2–12 km) for days or weeks sometimes forming up in battle order each day. In such circumstances either commander could prevent a battle from occurring, and unless both commanders were willing to at least some degree to give battle, both sides might march off without engaging. [61] [62] Forming up in battle order was a complicated and premeditated affair, which took several hours. Infantry were usually positioned in the centre of the battle line, with light infantry skirmishers to their front and cavalry on each flank. [63] Many battles were decided when one side's infantry force was attacked in the flank or rear and they were partially or wholly enveloped. [53] [64] In 215 BC the two armies established camps about 5 miles (8.0 km) from each other on a plain probably close to Ibera. For several days both simply sent out skirmishers, declining to deploy their main forces. On the same day both armies marched out in force and deployed in battle order. [50]

    The Romans posted their troops in their traditional manner, which probably means the two Roman legions were side by side in the centre of the army, with one Italian allied legion on each side of them. Each legion would have sent its javelin-armed skirmishers out in front and formed up in their usual three lines. The cavalry were divided and placed on each wing. [50] [51]

    Hasdrubal placed his unarmoured Iberian infantry in the centre of his line, with African heavy infantry on their left and heavy infantry described by Livy as "Poeni" [note 8] on their right both the Africans and the Poeni would have fought in a dense phalanx formation. [65] [44] Libyan and Iberian cavalry were positioned on the left wing facing the Roman and Roman-allied Iberian horse, while Numidian light cavalry covered the right wing facing the allied Italian horsemen. [50] The elephants were most probably placed at intervals in front of the infantry. The Balearic slingers and North African light infantry formed a skirmish line in front of the elephants. [41]

    Engagement Edit

    Livy is unclear or silent on many details of the battle. [66] For example, the effect, if any, of the elephants is not mentioned. At the Battle of Tunis in 255 BC, during the First Punic War, a line of Carthaginian elephants caused chaos among 13,000 Roman legionaries. [67] [68] In that case there were 100 elephants, not 20 or so perhaps there were too few elephants at Ibera to strike sufficient terror into the legionaries to disrupt their formation. [10] However the elephants were dealt with, the two Roman legions in the centre then advanced against the Iberian infantry facing them. [65] [64] The two sides' skirmishers exchanged missiles and withdrew behind their respective main infantry forces. [64] The front rank of the Roman legions and the Iberians also exchanged javelins and then moved towards contact. [50] The Iberians promptly fled. [64] [50] Livy states the Iberians knew that victory would mean they would march with the rest of Hasdrubal's army to Italy and that their unwillingness to leave Iberia made them unenthusiastic fighters. [50] [69] Their performance has often been contrasted with the resolute showing of Hannibal's Iberian infantry similarly in the centre of his line at the Battle of Cannae in the same year, [44] [41] [50] [51] although in their case, they had experienced several victories with Hannibal during the previous three years [70] Hasdrubal had suffered several defeats. [71] The Romans pushed through the sudden gap in the Carthaginian formation. [44]

    An indecisive skirmish developed on both wings of the armies between the opposing cavalry, with neither side gaining any advantage. [50] Meanwhile the strong blocks of North African and Poeni heavy infantry on either side of the Iberians partially turned and engaged the flanks of the two Roman legions. [65] But the Carthaginians also had to each face an allied legion to their front. Meanwhile, the Roman legions maintained discipline, did not pursue the fleeing Iberians, but wheeled to attack the rears of the two Carthaginian units. [44] Thus enveloped, the Carthaginians were in a hopeless situation. The Libyan infantry managed to put up a hard resistance, inflicting and suffering heavy casualties before being routed. [50] The Carthaginian cavalry and their elephants fled the field, having suffered few casualties. [41] The Romans attacked and looted the Carthaginian camp, and the Carthaginian's provisions, equipment and treasury fell into their hands. [50]

    The casualties suffered by each side are unclear: the modern historian John Lazenby, basing himself on Livy states the Carthaginians were almost annihilated [65] Nigel Bagnall writes that Carthaginian casualties were heavy [51] and Richard Miles that the Carthaginians suffered a heavy defeat. [72] However, the fact that in other battles in Iberia where Polybius's more reliable account has survived Livy's record of Carthaginian casualties is up to five times greater than those given by Polybius calls his assessment into doubt. [66] Hasdrubal survived the battle with most of his elephants and cavalry, and a few infantry (mostly Iberians). Ibera probably surrendered to the Romans after the battle. [41] The shattered Carthaginian army retired to Cartagena, leaving the Romans firmly established in north-east Iberia and blocking the overland route to Italy. [38]

    The Scipio brothers did not mount an immediate campaign against the Carthaginians. They continued their strategy of raids, instigating Iberian tribes to rebel, and building up their power base. [51] This was largely because the Battle of Cannae was fought in Italy at approximately the same time and turned out disastrously for the Romans for several years they concentrated their manpower and resources on safeguarding their homeland leaving nothing for Iberia. On at least one occasion the Scipios complained to the Senate regarding this lack of reinforcement. [73] They would fight on in Iberia with varying results until 212 BC, when the Romans were heavily defeated at the Battle of the Upper Baetis and both of the Scipios were killed. [44] [74]

    Strategic importance Edit

    The Scipios' victory confirmed the Carthaginian inability to reinforce Hannibal overland, robbed him of anticipated seaborne reinforcements and further weakened the Carthaginian hold on the Iberian tribes. [43] [75] [76] Hannibal's youngest brother, Mago, had marched into Italy with him in 218 BC, then been sent back to Carthage to gather reinforcements. He raised an army which was meant to land at Locri in Italy in 215 BC, but he was diverted to Iberia after the Carthaginian defeat at Ibera. [65] [77] The classicist Howard Scullard is of the opinion that the Roman victory prevented them from being expelled from Iberia, not least because the Iberian tribes would have abandoned Rome and from Hasdrubal promptly marching at full strength to reinforce Hannibal in Italy, where "Rome could hardly withstand the double force." [78] Klaus Zimmermann agrees: "the Scipios' victory . may well have been the decisive battle of the war" [38]


    VOTESCAM AND THE WAR PARTY: A FEW THOUGHTS

    Well, this one says it all, and I find myself in a great deal of agreement with the sentiments expressed in it:

    Now, what epitomized my own political bi-partisanship was this telling paragraph indeed, I had to re-read it, for it perfectly expressed my own cynicism to the American political "process":

    "If we project the case of Maine’s disappearing voters nationwide, onto all states holding caucuses instead of primaries, then the fraud takes on a scale that threatens to delegitimize the entire process. This at a time when the entire political system is distrusted and even disdained by large portions of the electorate: turnout in the GOP primaries has been significantly lagging this time around, hardly what one would expect from the rank-and-file of a party supposedly eager to overturn the Obama administration. With billionaires buying elections, and both parties under the thumb of the Money Power, ordinary Americans just don’t take elections that seriously anymore. The idea that the electoral process confers any kind of real legitimacy on the victors is a fast-dissipating myth. "

    "What, then, should anti-interventionists do – what should be our attitude toward electoral politics, and what are the implications for a larger strategy for social change?

    "Activists have to understand that we’re in this for the long haul: the battle for peace and liberty is bound to be a protracted conflict, one in which we’re going to have to utilize every weapon at our disposal. The idea that we’re going to make an electoral breakthrough, and accomplish much of our agenda in one fell swoop, is wishful thinking: success, when it comes, is going to be incremental. Additionally, it is going to come not as a result of five-second "sound bites" and glitzy campaign ads, but as a consequence of a sustained educational campaign that aims at raising awareness of the vital issues. "

    I am bold to suggest, however, that America's problems go much deeper. We have become victims, as the article suggests, of our own propaganda. We believe we're the best at everything (and we're not. and if you have any doubts about that, stick around for a couple more generations when you see what the country is like being run by the products of our "education" system).

    The fault of American politics is that we are seeking political solutions to a cultural and spiritual problem: corruption, and materialism. Frankly, the American Empire cannot survive, and the elites are trying mightily to replace it with a global one, and that won't work either, for the cultural problem will remain, the culture of corruption and materialism is, after all, the culture they have created. While I agree with Raimondo, that success will be incremental, and over the long term, I believe that success can only come as Americans realize their institutions are corrupt because they no longer take control of their own education, of their own thoughts, and literally own the culture.

    Back when another global empire was in the final stages of collapse, it was up to local cultural institutions to pick up the cross of handing on culture and learning, but that didn't work too well either, as the one institution - the Roman Church - that was in a position to do that turned to hate and repression and tyranny. We see the same race to fundamentalisms and similar institutions within our own country. It was only in the Renaissance that Western Europe began to wake up and gradually, painfully, throw off those institutions of "thought police." It is not for nothing, as our Amerikan Empire enters the final phases of corruption, that we see politicians of both the right and the left racing to wrap themselves in the flag and a thin veneer of religiosity.

    What we need now, is not more religion or "edgycashun", but a kind of Renaissance of culture and learning, of the free exchange of ideas and information, especially of those threatening to any emergent tyrannies. This is what the talking heads on the television and radio media don't get about Ron Paul. Congressman Paul knows he doesn't stand a chance of winning the presidency. But that isn't, in the final analysis, what his candidacy is about. It's about ideas, about calling into question the institutions (like the Federal Reserve) that have been grafted on to our republic to transform it into an empire. It's about calling into question the idea of that empire itself. And in the final analysis, it's about planting ideas for the long term. I may disagree with some of the Congressman's notions, and I do. But at least he's raising the bar of the debate. And young people, bored with the same old crapola spewing out of the mouths of Obama, Gingrich, Santorum, and Romney, are listening.


    PART ONE
    ROME AND CARTHAGE: 264 BC
    1. Two Republics
    2. Warfare
    PART TWO
    THE FIRST PUNIC WAR AND AFTERMATH: 264-218
    3. Sicily and its Seas, 264-257
    4. Africa and after: 256-249
    5. Stalemate and Checkmate: 249-241
    6. Between the Wars: 241-218
    PART THREE
    THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: 218-201
    7. Hannibal's invasion, 218-211
    8. The War beyond Italy
    9. Scipio and Roman Victory: 210-201
    PART FOUR
    THE LAST CONFLICT
    10. Rome, Masinissa, and Carthage
    11. The Triumph of Rome
    Conclusions
    Appendix 152
    the sources

    Dexter Hoyos

    Ancient Warfare and Civilization


    Did Romans know America existed?

    Did Romans know about the New World? Which Romans? All of them? Or just the people that make military decisions? Romans knew "about" China and traded in silk, but it was just too far away for military activity and a there's lot of stuff between Rome & China. There's some speculation that Caesar wanted to take Parthia (killed just before he left for it) followed by India, duplicating Alexander. Did HE wonder about China? I digress.

    The major weakness in Roman/NewWorld contact is "why". Vikings were always on the lookout for good land, Columbus wanted to make his fortune. I can't think of any "explorer" who was financed just to go and look around for fun. The most logical explanation for pre-Columbian contact would be trade, and there is zero evidence for that. You have to substantiate a story with evidence: who took what trade goods, where did they leave from, where did they arrive, what did they trade for? The bar is set pretty high to establish trade.

    THAT BEING THE CASE, there is an unexplainable amount of artifacts in Asia, South America, and Africa that just shouldn't be there. It's like those Canadian Roman "wreck" items: they mean nothing by themselves even if they're authentic . they need context. How do we know the captain of some 1800's ship didn't have a hobby collecting Roman artifacts? His ship wrecked some place else and the items washed up where they were found? They're not related to the wreck close by . that the Canadian govt won't let them excavate . for some reason? Hmmmm

    Still, the evidence keeps piling up. Artifacts, sure . but there is "genetic" evidence (DNA human, animal, plant). Chickens in Peru that could have only come from Pre-Columbian stock in Asia. A South American tribe with Polynesian DNA. Asian-native plants appearing in South America. SouthAmerica-native plants appearing in Asia and Africa. Africa-native plants appearing in South America. Even human intestinal parasites. There's no explanation for this, just evidence. No narrative to tie things together . još.

    There are Egyptian mummies that contain THC, nicotine, & cocaine. Hash grows in the MIddle East, no problem. It is believed that at one-time there was a tobacco plant native to Africa which has since gone extinct: that takes care of that. However, there is no explanation for cocaine found in mummies (verified by multiple European labs). There are scientific papers on the impossibility of the coca plant ever growing in the Old World. Africa is a pretty big place: if cocaine could be grown in quantity anywhere there, the world face of drug trafficking would change. There's no explanation, but the presence of cocaine in mummies is fact. Chemistry reports are available to be read. A lot more research has been done after the Univ of CA post below.

    Like many academic fields, the old guard is quite resistant to any change in the "no contact before Columbus" paradigm . which is why a new field has been created by shear force of evidence: Pre-Columbian Trans-Oceanic Contact.
    Here's a nice journal: Pre-Columbiana: A Journal of Long-Distance Contacts – Stephen C. Jett
    There's another called "Migration and Diffusion" that I haven't been able to find (from Italy).

    If you think this needs to be filed with Graham Hancock's flying pyramids, the University of California, Riverside doesn't seem to think so:
    American Drugs in Egyptian Mummies
    “And the list goes on and on - some evidence being better than others - but as a whole it seems pretty much irrefutable. Claims to the contrary seem to be made by individuals with a vested interest in the isolationist position. The evidence, pro and con, when evaluated objectively, would seem without question, to favor the diffusionist position (which claims that pre-Columbian contacts took place). “

    So, did the Romans know about the New World? Maybe . I think an "absolute no" is precluded by still increasing evidence.


    • Acquista questo prodotto e ricevi 90 giorni gratis di streaming musicale con Amazon Music Unlimited
      Dopo l'acquisto, riceverai un'email contenente informazioni su come iscriverti ad Amazon Music Unlimited. Questa promozione non si applica ai prodotti digitali. Vedi condizioni

    Dalla quarta di copertina

    &ldquoMy cavils in the previous paragraph notwithstanding, Hoyos and his team are to be complimented for their success in bringing the multifaceted &ldquoaction history&rdquo of the wars to life in a striking and sophisticated way.&rdquo
    Bryn Mawr Classical Review

    Widely considered the greatest conflicts of antiquity, the Punic Wars irrevocably changed the course of world history. A Companion to the Punic Wars provides a comprehensive new survey of the three wars fought by Rome and Carthage between 264 and 146 BC. Featuring a series of thought-provoking essays from a community of distinguished international scholars, the collection provides a unique portrayal of the
    bloody &ldquohundred years&rsquo war&rdquo that created a legend out of Hannibal and left Rome with
    a world empire.

    The three wars are covered comprehensively from the Roman and Carthaginian military and naval strategies to diplomacy, economic and social factors, historiography, and the achievements of the charismatic Carthaginian general Hannibal. A Companion to the Punic Wars offers invaluable new insights to students and scholars alike into an epic struggle that had far reaching impacts on the Western world.

    L'autore

    Dexter Hoyos is retired Associate Professor in Classics and Ancient History from the University of Sydney, Australia. He has published extensively on Latin teaching and aspects of Roman and Carthaginian history (including on Hannibal&rsquos actual route over the Alps). His books include Unplanned Wars (1998), Hannibal&rsquos Dynasty (2003), Truceless War (2007), and Hannibal: Rome&rsquos Greatest Enemy (2008).

    Dexter Hoyos is retired Associate Professor in Classics and Ancient History from the University of Sydney, Australia. He has published extensively on Latin teaching and aspects of Roman and Carthaginian history (including on Hannibal&rsquos actual route over the Alps). His books include Unplanned Wars (1998), Hannibal&rsquos Dynasty (2003), Truceless War (2007), and Hannibal: Rome&rsquos Greatest Enemy (2008).


Video, Sitemap-Video, Sitemap-Videos