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African Institution

African Institution

Zakon o ukidanju trgovine robljem usvojen je 1807. Ubrzo nakon toga, u srpnju 1807. godine, članovi Društva za ukidanje trgovine robljem osnovali su Afričku instituciju, organizaciju koja se obavezala da će nadzirati izvršenje zakona, zabrana trgovine robljem od strane stranih sila i promoviranje "civilizacije i sreće" Afrike. Vojvoda od Gloucestera postao je prvi predsjednik, a članovi odbora su bili Thomas Clarkson, William Wilberforce, Henry Brougham, James Stephen, Granville Sharp i Zachary Macaulay. Bankar, Henry Thornton, postao je blagajnik.

Wayne Ackerson, autor knjige Afrička institucija i pokret protiv ropstva u Velikoj Britaniji (2005) tvrdi: "Afrička institucija je bila ključna abolicionistička i grupa protiv ropstva u Velikoj Britaniji početkom devetnaestog stoljeća, a njeni članovi uključivali su članove kraljevske porodice, istaknute advokate, članove parlamenta i zapažene reformatore poput Williama Wilberforcea, Thomasa Clarksona i Zachary Macaulay. Fokusirajući se na širenje zapadne civilizacije u Afriku, ukidanje trgovine robljem u inostranstvu i poboljšanje života robova u britanskim kolonijama, utjecaj grupe se proširio i na britanske diplomatske odnose, osim na unutrašnje poslove vlade. Institucija je dvadeset godina nosila baklju za reformu ropstva i otvorila put za kasnije humanitarne napore u Velikoj Britaniji. "

Jack Gratusto je u svojoj knjizi zauzeo kritičkiji pogled na afričku instituciju Velika bela laž (1973): "Motivi koji stoje iza formiranja Institucije u skladu s abolicionističkom logikom. Jedini zadovoljavajući način na koji je trebalo prekinuti trgovinu robljem bio je prekid njenog izvora. Naučite Afrikance da budu kršćani, da se ponašaju kao Evropljani (a posebno britanski Europljani) i prodavati robu osim robova, a trgovini robljem mora doći kraj. "

William Wilberforce je jasno stavio do znanja da smatra da bi organizacija trebala učiniti sve što je u njenoj moći da Afričane prevede u kršćanstvo. 1811. napisao je: "Uistinu, postoji poseban poziv na naš senzibilitet u ovom trenutku, jer proporcionalno kako je u svijetu težak dio robova, trebamo se radovati svakoj prilici da ih dovedemo pod njihove sadašnje patnje, i osigurati im bogatu nadoknadu obrnute sreće. "

U julu 1807. afrička institucija žalila se na negativno gledište Afrikanaca koje promoviraju novine i knjige: "Portret crnca rijetko je nacrtan olovkom njegovog ugnjetavača, i on je to prihvatio u iskrivljenom stavu ropstva. Ako ga jedan od tih svjedoka s predrasudama optuži za brutalnu glupost, drugi ga oporezuje najfinijom simulacijom i najgenijalnijim metodama prijevare. Ako su crnci predstavljeni kao podni i kukavički, oni su u istoj količini izloženi kao hrabra smrt u najgnusnijim oblicima ... Neosjetljivost i pretjerana strast, apatija i entuzijazam, nedostatak prirodne naklonosti i naklonost prema prijateljima ... sve im to pripisuju iste nedosljedne olovke. "

Afrička institucija nastavila je nadzirati način rada trgovine robljem. U prosincu 1816. izvijestilo se da se 60.000 robova još uvijek prevozi preko Atlantika svake godine. Od toga je 15.000 bilo na sjevernoameričkim brodovima koji su nosili španske zastave. Kao rezultat ovih informacija, lord Castlereagh je na međunarodnoj konferenciji u Aix-la-Chapelleu trebao postojati: "Budna nadzornost naoružane i međunarodne policije na obali Afrike ... Da bi takvu policiju učinili legalnom ili djelotvoran po svom cilju, mora biti uspostavljen pod sankcijom i pod vlašću svih civiliziranih država. "

Portret crnca rijetko je bio nacrtan olovkom njegovog ugnjetavača, a on je za to pristao u iskrivljenom stavu ropstva. sve im pripisuju iste nedosljedne olovke.


Istorijski crni fakulteti i univerziteti

Naši urednici će pregledati ono što ste podnijeli i odlučiti hoćete li izmijeniti članak.

Povijesno crni fakulteti i univerziteti (HBCU), visokoškolske ustanove u Sjedinjenim Državama osnovane prije 1964. za afroameričke studente. Termin je nastao Zakonom o visokom obrazovanju iz 1965. godine, kojim je prošireno federalno finansiranje koledža i univerziteta.

Prvi HBCU -ovi osnovani su u Pensilvaniji i Ohaju prije Američkog građanskog rata (1861–65) sa svrhom da se crnoj omladini - koja je zbog rasne diskriminacije u velikoj mjeri onemogućena da pohađa uspostavljene koledže i univerzitete - omogući osnovno obrazovanje i obuku da postanu učitelji ili trgovci. Institut za obojenu omladinu (ukratko Afrički institut pri svom osnivanju) otvoren je na farmi izvan Philadelphije 1837. Danas je to Univerzitet Cheyney u Pensilvaniji, koji je dio državnog sistema visokog obrazovanja u Pennsylvaniji. Institut Ashmun, koji se takođe nalazi u blizini Philadelphije, pružao je teološku obuku kao i osnovno obrazovanje od svog osnivanja 1854. godine. Postao je Univerzitet Lincoln 1866. godine u čast predsjednika SAD -a. Abraham Lincoln i bio je privatan do 1972. Najstarija privatna HBCU u SAD-u osnovana je 1856. godine, kada je Metodistička biskupska crkva otvorila Univerzitet Wilberforce u Tawawa Springsu (današnji Wilberforce), Ohio, kao suodgojnu instituciju za crnce koji su izbjegli ropstvo na jugu podzemnom željeznicom. Zatvoren je 1862. godine, ali je ponovo uključen 1863. pod pokroviteljstvom Afričke metodističke episkopalne crkve (AME), historijski afroameričke metodističke denominacije.

Nakon završetka građanskog rata i ukidanja ropstva, HBCU -ovi su osnovani na cijelom jugu uz podršku Freedmen's Bureau -a, savezne organizacije koja je djelovala tijekom obnove kako bi pomogla bivšim robovima da se prilagode slobodi. Takve institucije kao što su Univerzitet u Atlanti (1865 sada Univerzitet Clark Atlanta), Univerzitet Howard i Koledž Morehouse (1867 prvobitno Institut Augusta) pružale su obrazovanje o slobodnoj umjetnosti i obučavale studente za karijere kao nastavnici ili ministri i misionari, dok su se druge usredotočile na pripremu studenata za industrijska ili poljoprivredna zanimanja. Neke institucije, poput Morehousea, bile su muške škole. Drugi, poput Spelman koledža (1924. koji je prvobitno osnovan 1881. kao žensko sjemenište baptista u Atlanti), bili su isključivo žene. Većina je, međutim, bila suedukativna.

Rast HBCU -a potaknuo je kontroverze među istaknutim Afroamerikancima krajem 19. i početkom 20. stoljeća. Neki su kritičari primijetili da su mnoge HBCU -ove, posebno one koji su postojali u godinama neposredno nakon građanskog rata, osnovali bijelci, od kojih su mnogi imali negativne predrasude o društvenim, kulturnim i intelektualnim sposobnostima crnaca. Budući da je crncima općenito bilo zabranjeno, posebno na jugu, uspostavljenim institucijama, kritičari su se zapitali da li su odvojene škole zapravo ometale napore ka socijalnoj i ekonomskoj jednakosti s bijelcima.

Drugo je pitanje bilo hoće li stručno osposobljavanje ili klasičnije „intelektualno“ obrazovanje najbolje služiti interesima Afroamerikanaca. Booker T. Washington, uzorni pobornik stručnog osposobljavanja, osnovao je Institut Tuskegee (1881. sada Univerzitet Tuskegee), koji je isticao poljoprivredno i industrijsko obrazovanje. Poput Hamptonovog normalnog i industrijskog instituta (1868 sada Hampton University), Tuskegee je poslužio kao model za nekoliko narednih HBCU-a koji su organizirali prema amandmanu 1890 na Zakon o koledžu za grantove iz 1862. koji je promovirao stvaranje afroameričkih koledža za dodjelu zemljišta. Najistaknutiji zastupnik intelektualnog pristupa bio je sociolog W.E.B. koji je školovao Univerzitet Harvard. Du Bois, koji je tvrdio da je potrebno uzgajati "talentovanu desetinu" dobro obrazovanih vođa zajednice. Čak i dok se ova rasprava nastavljala, institucionalizacija rasne segregacije unutar i izvan juga dodatno je otežala crnim studentima studiranje bilo gdje osim na univerzitetskim univerzitetima sve do nastojanja desegregacije sredinom 20. stoljeća.

Početkom 21. stoljeća bilo je više od 100 HBCU -a u Sjedinjenim Državama, pretežno na jugu. Dok su neke bile dvogodišnje škole, mnoge su nudile četverogodišnje učenje. Neki su zadržali fokus na zanimanju, dok su se drugi razvili u velike istraživačke institucije. Također, dok je nekoliko HBCU -a i dalje imalo pretežno afroamerička studentska tijela, drugi više nisu.


Izjava misije Instituta za afroameričke studije

Institut za afroameričke studije (AFAM) oslanja se na različite tradicije afrikanskih studija i bavi se humanističkim, društvenim i obrazovnim područjima. Fakultet je ujedinjen u svojoj misiji promicanja proučavanja ljudi afričkog porijekla i njihovog iskustva u cijeloj dijaspori, promovirajući područje afroameričkih studija kao glavne akademske discipline i služeći kao spremište za kulturna i povijesna istraživanja.

Slijedeći svoju misiju, Institut nudi interdisciplinarni i višestruki pristup polju afroameričkih studija. Njegovi glavni ciljevi uključuju:

  • Pružanje studentima okruženja za učenje u kojem će cijeniti historiju, umjetnost i kulturu Afroamerikanaca.
  • Razvoj kritičkih i analitičkih alata za istraživanje ljudskog prosvjetljenja i informiranog građanstva.
  • Osvjetljavanje povijesti i kulture Afroamerikanaca u globalnom kontekstu.
  • Razvijanje institucionalnih istraživačkih vještina vitalnih za uspjeh na diplomskim i stručnim studijama.

Vizija Instituta, kao i njegova misija i ciljevi, zasnovana je na crnoj intelektualnoj tradiciji, nadovezujući se na ideje učenjaka poput W.E.B. Du Bois, Anna Julia Cooper, Langston Hughes, Carter G. Woodson, Ida B. Wells i drugi koji su vjerovali u sistematsko proučavanje crnog iskustva. Iz ove baze nastavlja istraživati ​​nove načine razumijevanja života i iskustva crnaca kroz studije performansa, transatlantske studije, vizualnu kulturu i muziku.


Booker T. Washington ’s Education

U Maldenu, Washingtonu je bilo dozvoljeno da ide u školu tek nakon što je svako jutro radio od 4-9 ujutro u lokalnoj solani prije nastave. Bio je to drugi posao u lokalnom rudniku uglja, gdje je prvi put čuo dva svoja rada o Hamptonovom institutu, školi za nekadašnje robove u jugoistočnoj Virdžiniji, koju je 1868. godine osnovao brigadni general Samuel Chapman. Chapman je bio vođa crnačkih trupa za Uniju tokom građanskog rata i bio je posvećen poboljšanju obrazovnih mogućnosti za Afroamerikance.

1872. godine Washington je prešao 500 milja do Hamptona, gdje je bio odličan student i dobio visoke ocjene. On je nastavio studirati na Wayland seminaru u Washingtonu, DC, ali je toliko impresionirao Chapmana da je pozvan da se vrati u Hampton kao učitelj 1879. Chapman je taj koji će uputiti Washington za ulogu direktora nove škole za afričke Amerikanci u Tuskegeeju, Alabama: Normalni i industrijski institut Tuskegee, današnji Univerzitet Tuskegee. Washington je preuzeo ulogu 1881. godine u dobi od 25 godina i radit će na Institutu Tuskegee do njegove smrti 1915.

Washington je bio taj koji je angažovao George Washington Carvera za predavanje poljoprivrede u Tuskegeeju 1896. Carver bi nastavio biti poznata ličnost u istoriji crnaca, i sam je napravio veliki napredak u botanici i poljoprivrednoj tehnologiji.


NOVI NASLOVI

Prelazak vjerskih granica: islam, kršćanstvo i "joruba religija" u Lagosu, Nigerija
Marloes Janson

Religijski pluralizam, kakav se susreće u viševjerskim okruženjima, poput najvećeg nigerijskog grada Lagosa, osporava mnogo toga što već dugo uzimamo zdravo za gotovo o religiji, uključujući gotove binarnosti kršćanstva naspram islama, religije naspram sekularizma, vjerskog monizma naspram politeizma, i tradicija nasuprot modernosti. U ovoj knjizi Marloes Janson nudi bogatu etnografiju religija, vjerski pluralizam i praksu u Lagosu, analizirajući kako takozvani 'vjerski kupci' prelaze vjerske granice, te koegzistenciju različitih vjerskih tradicija u kojima se praktičari s njima bave istovremeno. Pokušavajući razviti širu koncepciju religije koja se pomjera od uske analize vjerskih tradicija kao međusobno isključive, Janson umjesto toga nudi perspektivu koja se fokusira na složenu dinamiku njihovih stvarnih zapleta. Uključujući primjere iz stvarnog života koji ilustriraju religiju u Lagosu kroz vjersku praksu i proživljena iskustva, ova studija uzima u obzir ambivalentnost, nedosljednost i nepredvidljivost proživljene religije, predlažući skup kao analitički okvir za istraživanje konceptualnih i metodoloških mogućnosti koje se mogu otvoriti kao rezultat.

ISBN: 9781108838917, 242 pp, jun 2021

Privilegirani prekarijat: Bijeli radnici i duga tranzicija Južne Afrike na pravilo većine
Danelle van Zyl-Hermann

Bijeli radnici zauzeli su jedinstven društveni položaj u Južnoj Africi iz doba aparthejda. Zaštićeni od konkurencije rada crnaca u zamjenu za podršku režimu bijele manjine, njihov rasni status efektivno je skrivao njihovu klasnu ranjivost. Usredotočen na ovu zapletenost rase i klase, Privileged Precariat ispituje kako su bijeli radnici Južne Afrike doživjeli rušenje rasne države i uspostavljanje vladavine crne većine. Počevši od 1970-ih, pokazuje kako su reforme aparthejda predstavljale povlačenje državne podrške bjelini radničke klase, šaljući radnike u potrazi za novim načinima zaštite svojih interesa u svijetu koji se brzo mijenja. Danelle van Zyl-Hermann prati promjenjive strategije Sindikata rudara plavih ovratnika, koji su kulminirali njegovim ponovnim pronalaskom, do 2010. godine, kao Pokret solidarnosti, društveni pokret apelirajući na kulturni nacionalizam. Integrirajući jedinstvene povijesne i etnografske dokaze sa globalnim raspravama, Privileged Precariat nudi kronološko i interpretativno preispitivanje nedavne prošlosti Južne Afrike i doprinosi novim spoznajama sa globalnog juga raspravama o rasi i klasi u doba neoliberalizma.


Povijest afričkog visokog obrazovanja od antike do danas: kritička sinteza - Autor Y. G-M. Lulat

Povijest afričkog visokog obrazovanja od antike do danas: kritička sinteza autor Lulat, Y. G-M , Westport, Conn., Praeger Publishers, 2005, xii + 625 str.

Poznato je da intelektualci, kao i visokoškolske ustanove koje ih njeguju i njeguju, imaju značajnu ulogu u razvoju društva. Uprkos tome, istorijske studije visokoškolskih ustanova na afričkom kontinentu i dalje su oskudne. Iako određeni izuzeci postoje, čak i oni imaju samo ograničen fokus. Jedno od vjerojatnih objašnjenja je činjenica da je afrički kontinent u cjelini jednostavno prevelik kao jedinica za analizu. Drugi je kompartmentalizacija istraživača prema službenim jezicima regija koje će se proučavati, pa svaka sveobuhvatna analiza izvan granica, poput anglofona i frankofonije, postaje prilično teška. S obzirom na ovu situaciju, štaviše, razumljivo je da je nekoliko povijesnih djela o visokom obrazovanju u Africi, napisanih na engleskom jeziku, pristrano prema bivšim britanskim kolonijama nakon kolonijalizma.

Među onim djelima koja su se fokusirala na visoko obrazovanje pod britanskim utjecajem, djelo Erica Ashbya moglo bi se nazvati klasikom, prvo opsežno djelo na ovu temu objavljeno nakon dekolonizacije. 1 1 Eric Ashby, Univerziteti: Britanski, Indijski, Afrički: Studija o ekologiji visokog obrazovanja (London: Weidenfeld i Nicolson, 1966).
Novija djela uključuju Okunor, 2 2 Shiame Okunor, Politika, nesporazumi, zablude: istorija kolonijalnih univerziteta (New York: Peter Lang, 1991).
koja se fokusirala na zapadnoafričke zemlje pod jakim britanskim i američkim utjecajem, poput Gold Coasta, Sierra Leonea i Liberije. Dodatni značajan rad na visokom obrazovanju je Istraživački program univerziteta istočne i južne Afrike koji je sproveden 1984. 3 3 L. Tembo i drugi, ur., Razvoj visokog obrazovanja u istočnoj i južnoj Africi (Najrobi: Hedaya Educational Books, 1985).
Takve studije obično posmatraju kolonijalno doba kao početak modernog visokog obrazovanja u Africi, i ne pozivaju se na visokoškolske ustanove koje su postojale prije kolonijalizma. U ovom djelu, međutim, Lulat namjerava predstaviti historiju visokog obrazovanja u Africi ne kao proizvod „modernizacije“ koju su uvele kolonijalne sile, već kao nešto što je duboko ukorijenjeno u afričkoj tradiciji. Da bi postigao ovaj cilj, autor odvažno pokušava obuhvatiti duži period - "od antike do danas" - kao i čitav jezički raspon koji se proteže na afričkom kontinentu (arapski, anglofon, frankofon i "evrofon").

Jedinstvenost ove knjige najdirektnije se odražava u 2. i 3. poglavlju. U 2. poglavlju autor tvrdi da je jedan od izvora afričkog visokog obrazovanja per-ankh, koji je započeo u Egiptu oko 2000. godine prije nove ere. Per-ankh nalazio se u egipatskom hramu i imao je više funkcija skriptorija, obuke i istraživačkog instituta. Pružao je visoko obrazovanje i vjerskim i sekularnim učenjacima, privukavši veliki broj sljedbenika koji su uključivali učenjake iz mediteranskog i arapskog svijeta - činjenica koja je autora potaknula da preispita eurocentričnu povijesnu perspektivu, koja je smatrala da su visoko obrazovanje u Afriku donijeli Europljani modernizacija. Ovo poglavlje također se dotiče drugih obrazovnih sistema koji su postojali u Africi, poput onih povezanih s etiopskim pravoslavnim crkvama koji su obuhvatali osnovnu pismenost do višeg akademskog znanja, kao i islamski obrazovni sistem koji se širio zajedno s islamskom religijom. Zajednička karakteristika ovih „predmodernih“ afričkih obrazovnih sistema bila je ta što su zajedno obučavali vjerske i svjetovne vođe bez odvajanja religije i politike. U ovom poglavlju također se ističe autorovo objašnjenje sofisticiranih obrazovnih sistema koji su imali društvenu važnost - iako sporadično - prije modernizacije.

Poglavlje 3 nastavlja s objašnjenjem arapsko-islamske perspektive koja je unesena u afričko visoko obrazovanje. Posebno je zanimljivo autorovo objašnjenje kako se arapsko-islamsko obrazovanje u Africi transformiralo pod strujama modernizacije koje su se dogodile nakon 19. stoljeća. Islamsko obrazovanje u Africi stalno je mijenjalo svoj oblik zajedno s promjenama u društvu, budući da je obrazovanje kroz „moderan“ školski sistem i s njim povezane vjerodajnice postalo važno za život i postizanje uspjeha u afričkom svijetu, a islamsko obrazovanje se prilagodilo takvi društveni zahtjevi za obrazovanjem. Nasuprot tome, u arapsko-islamskom svijetu obrazovanje je nastavilo održavati društvenu važnost u svom izvornom obliku još od sedmog stoljeća. U isto vrijeme, autor tvrdi da su afro-arapske države težile ka „modernom“ visokom obrazovanju porijeklom sa Zapada-činjenica koja ukazuje da su očekivanja društava i država prema obrazovanju bila višestruka i pod utjecajem različitih pogleda na svijet.

Zaista, nezadovoljavajuće je raspravljati o razvoju afričkog visokog obrazovanja, a da se to pitanje ne stavi u dugu istoriju regije u cjelini. Štaviše, kako autor s pravom ističe, obrazovni sistemi duboko ukorijenjeni u društvenu strukturu i vjerske aktivnosti postojali su mnogo prije uvoza zapadnog obrazovanja. Žalosno je, međutim, da sam autor nije u potpunosti odstupio od podvojenosti prije i poslije modernizacije te da se njegov argument u drugoj polovini knjige skliznuo u objašnjavanje zašto su afričke tradicije prekinute nakon napretka Europe. Po mom mišljenju, autorovo naizgled prihvatanje postojanja takvog prekidanja donekle umanjuje vrijednost prve polovine knjige. Ako je današnje afričko obrazovanje pitanje ere post-modernizacije, na kraju krajeva, ne treba kopati povijest koja seže sve do drevnog egipatskog i etiopskog pravoslavnog obrazovanja-već se umjesto toga može jednostavno početi pisati iz kolonijalnog razdoblja ili misionarskog obrazovanja u Najranije u 15. vijeku.

Još jedna žalosna stvar je ta što se autor uključuje u opsežnu diskusiju o visokoškolskim ustanovama koje su izbjegle „prekid veze tokom modernizacije“, poput Al-Azhara u Egiptu, ali se tako važni podaci gube u opsežnom objašnjenju „prekidanja veze“ koje slijedi. Štaviše, nije predstavljena analiza u pogledu vrsta uslova koji su omogućili Al-Azharu da preživi. Iako ovo može biti neizbježno ograničenje ove vrste historijskog djela, u mjeri u kojoj ima za cilj obuhvatiti opsežne vremenske periode, kao i geografska područja, rezultat je da su mnoga važna pitanja opisana bez ikakve popratne dublje analize. Autor piše o anglofonskoj Africi u dva odvojena poglavlja, na primjer, jedno pokriva područja kojima su izravno vladali Britanci, a drugo se fokusira na ona koja su izbjegla kolonizaciju. Dok su se zemlje poput Etiopije uspjele oduprijeti kolonijalnoj invaziji, one su ipak promovirale modernizaciju vlastitim inicijativama i osnovale vlastite univerzitete po uzoru na Zapad. S druge strane, objašnjava autor, bilo je kolonija u kojima su univerzitete osnovale kolonijalne vlade na vlasti. Mogao je, dakle, analizirati kako su različita okruženja unutar ova dva stila visokoškolskih ustanova uticala na proces „prekidanja/nastavka“ s obzirom na tradiciju. Doduše, takva bi istraga bila otežana zbog činjenice da se društvena važnost obrazovanja mijenja s vremenom i okruženjem. Iako nije lako riješiti pitanja kao što su u kojoj su mjeri te promjene endogeno uzrokovane nasuprot egzogenim utjecajima, ili su afrički narod spremno prihvatili egzogene utjecaje ili su ih nametnuli stranci, to su vrste kritičnih pitanja to bi poboljšalo razumijevanje izgubljenog i nastavljenog.

Posljednja dva poglavlja knjige, poglavlja 7 i 8, pokrivaju period nakon sticanja nezavisnosti. Poglavlje 8 odstupa od okvira opisanog u uvodnom poglavlju i odnosi se na često raspravljana pitanja u vezi sa današnjim visokim obrazovanjem u Africi, kao što su jedinična cijena po studentu i jezici nastave. Kako autor ističe, uloga strane razvojne pomoći značajna je u smislu prebacivanja postkolonijalnih afričkih univerziteta na standardizirani globalni model. Objašnjava da su u vrijeme osamostaljenja bivše kolonijalne sile, kao i međunarodne organizacije poput UNESCO -a i Svjetske banke davale finansijsku i tehničku pomoć visokom obrazovanju kao prioritet kako bi se čelnici novih nezavisnih zemalja brzo pripremili za zadatke koji su pred njima Od njih. Međutim, u nekoliko decenija koje su uslijedile, ovaj zamah je opao, a međunarodna zajednica za pomoć zanemarila je visoko obrazovanje - činjenica koja je nesumnjivo uzrokovala pogoršanje kvalitete visokoškolskih ustanova u Africi.

U isto vrijeme, ovi afrički univerziteti izgubili su ranije postojeći osjećaj društvene odgovornosti u pogledu doprinosa razvoju zemlje, ili obrazovanja lidera na različitim pozicijama sa visokim akademskim znanjem i osjećajem dužnosti potrebnim za vođenje svojih zemalja. Stoga se diljem afričkog kontinenta može vidjeti fenomen u kojem su univerziteti iskorijenjeni iz svojih društava, a ponuđeni nivo obrazovanja ne odgovara zahtjevima radne snage u zemlji. Ova situacija je djelomično uzrokovana prenosom globalnih standarda putem međunarodne pomoći, a istovremeno su univerziteti sve više nastavili reproducirati elitnu kulturu. Uprkos svim idealima koji postoje, realnost je nastavila da pokazuje da univerziteti nisu orijentisani na lokalizaciju ili usluge u zajednici.

U skladu s izvornom svrhom knjige, česti su rasprave među afričkim znanstvenicima i političkim vođama da obrazovanje po uzoru na Zapad, kakvo su nametnuli kolonizatori, nije uistinu afričko, pa kao takvo Afrika mora oživjeti tradicionalni model obrazovanja. Prečesto se, međutim, čini da ovo ostaje na razini rasprave samo radi rasprave, a da se nikada nije istinski aktualiziralo. To uvelike duguje činjenici da su sami intelektualci proizvodi „nepovezane modernizacije“ i da kao takvi nemaju korijene u afričkim tradicijama. S druge strane, dvojbeno je hoće li bilo kakvo takozvano obrazovanje ukorijenjeno u tradicionalnom društvu imati smisla u današnjoj Africi. Ako „tradicija“ ostane ista dok se društvo mijenja, „tradicionalne obrazovne ideje“ će prirodno izgubiti društvenu važnost. U kojim bi onda situacijama lokalno razvijeni obrazovni modeli imali društvenu važnost, za razliku od egzogenih? Po mojoj procjeni, to će se dogoditi kada se sam obrazovni sistem razvije i promijeni sa društvom u cjelini, a oba kasnije započnu proces skupljanja historije, a ne kao zasebnih entiteta.

Stoga ne treba zanemariti ni slučajeve u kojima su visokoškolske ustanove, poput Al-Azhara, preživjele izazov modernizacije, jer su se transformisale u potpuno različite oblike. Prije bi trebalo analizirati razloge zašto su se ove institucije mogle fleksibilno prilagoditi promjenjivom okruženju i zadržati svoju društvenu relevantnost. Čineći to, afričari, posebno povjesničari, mogu početi prelaziti granicu između kolonijalne historiografije i predmoderne afričke historije. Ova knjiga pruža čitateljima mnoge slučajeve koji mogu poslužiti kao polazište za razvoj novih metoda za afričke studije visokog obrazovanja u tom pogledu.


(1787) Gouverner Morris "Prokletstvo ropstva"

Ustavna konvencija iz 1787. raspravljala je o instituciji ropstva. U govoru ispod Gouverner Morris, delegat iz Pensilvanije, opisao je negativan utjecaj institucije i na sjever i na jug i time na najviši nivo obznanio podjelu koja će na kraju izazvati građanski rat sedamdeset četiri godine kasnije.

BILA JE NAPOMENA INSTITUCIJA-To je bilo prokletstvo neba u državama u kojima je prevladalo. Usporedite slobodne regije Srednjih država, gdje bogato i plemenito uzgoj označava prosperitet i sreću ljudi, s bijedom i siromaštvom koje je preplavilo neplodni otpad Va. Maryda. i ostale države koje imaju robove. Putujte cijelim kontinentom i gledate kako se izgledi stalno mijenjaju s pojavom i nestankom ropstva. U trenutku kada napuštate E [krmu] sv. & ulaskom u [nw] York, učinci institucije postaju vidljivi Prolaskom kroz dresove i ulaskom u Pa.-svaki kriterij vrhunskog poboljšanja svjedoči promjeni. Nastavite prema Jugu, [svaki] korak, i svaki korak koji preduzmete kroz velika područja robova, predstavlja pustinju koja se povećava sa povećanjem udjela ovih bijednih bića.

Po kojem principu se robovi računaju u reprezentaciji? Jesu li to muškarci? Zatim ih učinite građanima i pustite ih da glasaju. Da li su vlasništvo? Zašto onda nije uključena druga nekretnina? Kuće u ovom gradu (Philada.) Vrijede više od svih bijednih robova koji pokrivaju močvarne močvare Južne Karoline. Prijem robova u Predstavništvo kada je pravično objašnjeno dolazi do sljedećeg: da stanovnik Gruzije i SC -a koji odlazi na obalu Afrike, uprkos najsvetijim zakonima čovječanstva, otkida svoja druga bića od njihovih najdražih veza i brana (n) ako oni budu najokrutnija ropstva, imat će više glasova u vladi. pokrenuta radi zaštite prava čovječanstva, nego građanin Pa. ili N [nji] Jerseyja koji gleda s hvalevrijednim užasom, tako podlom praksom. On bi dodao da je domaće ropstvo najistaknutija karakteristika aristokratskog izgleda predloženog Ustava.

Vazalizacija siromašnih oduvijek je bila omiljeni izdanak aristokracije. A koja je predložena kompenzacija sjevernim državama za žrtvovanje svakog principa prava, svakog impulsa čovječanstva. Oni se moraju obavezati da marširaju svojom milicijom u odbranu S [država] za njihovu odbranu od svih onih robova na koje se žale. Moraju opskrbiti plovila i pomorce, u slučaju stranog napada. Zakonodavno tijelo imat će neograničeno ovlaštenje oporezivati ​​ih trošarinama i carinama na uvoz: oboje će na njih pasti više nego na stanovnike juga za čaj od bohee koji koristi sjeverni slobodnjak, platit će više poreza nego cijela potrošnja bijedni rob, koji se sastoji samo od njegovog fizičkog izdržavanja i krpe koja pokriva njegovu golotinju.

S druge strane, južne države ne smiju se suzdržavati od uvoza svježih zaliha bijednih Afrikanaca, odjednom kako bi se povećala opasnost od napada, a teškoće u odbrani treba ih ohrabriti uvjeravanjem da imaju svoj glas the Natl. Govt. proporcionalno su povećane, a istovremeno će njihov izvoz i robovi biti oslobođeni svih doprinosa za javne usluge. Neka se ne kaže da direktno oporezivanje treba biti proporcionalno zastupljenosti. Besmisleno je pretpostaviti da je vlada Genl. može pružiti ruku direktno u džepove ljudi rasutih po tako prostranoj zemlji. Oni to mogu učiniti samo posredstvom izvoznog uvoza i akciza. Zbog čega se onda moraju podnijeti sve te žrtve? Prije bi se podložio porezu za plaćanje svih crnaca u Sjedinjenim Državama, nego bi osedlao potomstvo takvim Ustavom.


'Crna crkva' istražuje 'najvažniju instituciju' u afroameričkoj povijesti

Dvodijelni dokumentarni film "Crna crkva: Ovo je naša priča, ovo je naša pjesma" premijerno je prikazan u utorak i srijedu na PBS-u u 21 sat. Istočno vreme. Razgovarali smo s profesorom sa Harvarda Henryjem Louisom "Skipom" Gatesom Jr. - izvršnim producentom, piscem i voditeljem dokumentarca - i producenticom Stacey Holman o tome kako je izgledati 400 godina istorije o najistaknutijoj instituciji koja je njegovala Afroamerikance kroz porobljavanje i bitke za građanska prava i u 21. stoljeće za četiri sata. Ovaj intervju je malo razrađen radi jasnoće.

P: Šta je geneza ovog projekta?

Kapije: Htio sam ispričati priču o crnoj crkvi jer je to najstarija, najstabilnija i najvažnija institucija u povijesti afroameričkog naroda. Djelovala je gotovo kao laboratorija od koje su nastali afroamerički narod i afroamerička kultura. Tu su naši preci učili čitati i pisati. Tu su naučili štovati Boga koji oslobađa.

P: Zašto je ova istorija sada relevantna?

Kapije: Ova serija govori o milosti i otpornosti. Borba i iskupljenje. Nada i ozdravljenje. Dok smo snimali ovaj film, nismo imali pojma da će ove teme biti prijeko potrebne našem društvu, u našem svijetu, s obzirom na sve ono što smo izgubili i izdržali 2020.

Htjeli smo napraviti seriju o čistoj transcendentnoj moći vjerovanja. A učinak koji sam pokušavao stvoriti je sljedeći: Kad odem u crkvu oko 10 sati, prepuno je ljudi iz radničke klase, ljudi iz srednje klase i ljudi iz srednje klase. Siguran sam da ako ste popunili anketu, mnogi su agnostici ili ateisti - neki su vjernici - ali svejedno idu u crkvu.

I zašto odlaze? Oni idu za propovedanjem, muzikom, mahnitošću. I što je najvažnije, za osjećaj koji stvara. Upoređujem to sa osećajem da sam zamotan u toplo ćebe tokom hladne i ledene noći.

Naslijeđe se odražava kada propovjednik radi svoje. Kad zajedno pjevamo stare pjesme i lupamo nogama. Kad ministar dođe do točke, svi plješćemo i smijemo se. We know that we are keeping in line a tradition that is hundreds of years old. And that is what I wanted to celebrate — that blanket of comfort and warmth that you can only feel the presence of in the Black church.

P: With technological advances such as ministers being able to live-stream to thousands of people, do you think folks are missing out these sacred moments that come with in-person communion?

Gates: What you can’t get is the call-and-response, which is a fundamental aspect of the Black church. You can’t replicate that effect through Zoom. But the sermon is still powerful. And I think that the most powerful of the ministers, like Otis Moss Jr., Calvin Butts, Yvette Flunder, Bishop Vashti McKenzie — they have adapted and they have the power. T.D. Jakes, oh my God. T.D. Jakes can rattle the computer. He makes the iPad say “Amen!”

P: Apsolutno. So the Black church has managed to be both a safe haven for its members as well as a target for racist violence. How do you think leaders have been able to balance these two dynamics?

Holman: I think it’s really about why we are gathering, which is a higher power. It’s comforting. But to have a place that you do consider a safe place to get hit tragically, like Mother Emanuel, it can shatter you. But we went there to film and I think, if anything, it showed the resilience of the institution and of the people who are members of that institution. Regardless of what we are faced with, whatever joys and pains that may come our way, these spaces continue to be resilient.

P: Can you describe the energy that you felt filming in Mother Emanuel?

Holman: Skip had actually filmed there before but it was my first time as well as my other directors’. We didn’t know what to expect. But when we got there, it was just a peace. They had a beautiful marker for those who were killed, and it was like, we press on. And also knowing the backstory of this institution — how it was built, why it was rebuilt. It was incredible being in this huge historical marker. And it’s beautiful, too. The church is stunning.

P: So many young Black people are choosing to live spiritual lives rather than practicing organized religion. How do you think that affects the Black church?

Holman: I think just that word “organized” sounds strict and stringent. A lot of the rules and regulations feel like constraints to a younger generation. And a lot of the older people who are running some of these churches are kind of stuck in tradition. Anything new and fresh seems too worldly or doesn’t seem like it’s honoring or respectful to traditions that the church has had for years after years. And there are churches that are so young that they don’t have the elders and the wisdom that you get from your older generations. So I think it’s really just a lack of people opening up and saying maybe there’s a middle ground where we can meet. In a sense, both are missing out on an incredibly rich growth experience through faith and community.

P: What did you learn as you were working on this project that surprised you the most?

Gates: One of the big revelations of this series is that scholars have now established that between 8 and 20 percent of the Africans who came to the new world in the slave trade were practicing Muslims. Islam reached West Africa in the 10th century and was widespread by the 12th century. That was a huge surprise to me.


Tuskegee Institute's Founding

Tuskegee Institute was founded on July 4,1881 but the idea for a school for African Americans in the city of Tuskegee actually began two years prior. In 1879, Lewis Adams( link here to Adams page) was approached by W.F. Foster a Democrat running in the Alabama Senate race for his help in getting the black vote. Foster and Brooks both won their races and in return they upheld their end of the bargain by working to draft House Bill 165. The bill allocated $2,000 to fund the salaries of teachers and free tuition for students so long as they agreed to teach in Alabama’s public schools for at least two years. The bill also required that the school have at least 25 pupils and stay in session for at least nine months per year. The bill also created a board of commissioners to oversee the management of the school among the first three members: George W. Campbell and Lewis Adams.

When Booker T. Washington first arrived in Tuskegee, Alabama during the summer of 1881 Tuskegee State Normal School was a school in name only. Although the house bill allocated funding for teachers’ salaries it did not provide any land for the school. The earlier classes for Tuskegee State Normal School were held inside an old building owned by Butler Chapel AME Zion Church. The building or “shanty” as Washington described it would often leak when it rained. In his book Up From Slavery Washington wrote that he “ recalled that during the first months of school that he taught in this building it was in such poor repair that, whenever it rained, one of the older students would very kindly leave his lessons and hold an umbrella over [him].”

In September of 1881 Washington would purchase an abandoned farm known as The Old Burnt Place. The farm which was once a cotton plantation owned by William Banks Bowen got its nickname as a result of a portion of the farm being burned during the Civil War. The only buildings that remained were a cabin, old kitchen, stable and a hen house. The farm was purchased for $500 with a $200 down payment Hampton Institute’s treasurer James Marshall loaned Washington the money for the down payment from his personal account.

Within four months Washington would write Marshall a letter stating that “ four months and a half ago, without a dollar of our own, we contracted to buy a farm of a hundred acres, at a cost of five hundred dollars, on which to permanently locate our school. Today the last dollar has been paid.”


African Governance: Challenges and Their Implications

In Africa, as in every region, it is the quality and characteristics of governance that shape the level of peace and stability and the prospects for economic development. There is no more critical variable than governance, for it is governance that determines whether there are durable links between the state and the society it purports to govern. The nature of governance is central because it determines whether the exercise of authority is viewed as legitimate. Legitimate authority, in turn, is based on accepted laws and norms rather than the arbitrary, unconstrained power of the rulers. Governance also has an important regional dimension relating to the institutional structures and norms that guide a region’s approach to challenges and that help shape its political culture. 1 This is especially relevant in looking at Africa’s place in the emerging world since this large region consists of 54 states—close to 25% of the U.N.’s membership—and includes the largest number of landlocked states of any region, factors that dramatically affect the political environment in which leaders make choices. Consequently, national and regional governance factors interact continuously.

In this paper, I look first at the emergence of the African state system historically, including colonial legacies and the Cold War’s impact on governance dynamics. This discussion leads to an analysis of African conflict trends to help identify the most conflict-burdened sub-regions and to highlight the intimate link between governance and conflict patterns. The third section looks at the critical role of political and economic inclusion in shaping peace and stability and points to some of the primary challenges leaders face in deciding how to manage inclusion: whom to include and how to ‘pay’ for it. The essay concludes with a sobering reflection on the challenge of achieving resilient governance.

Impact of Historical Origins of African State System 2

It should not be surprising that there is a weak social compact between state and society in many African states. Most of the region’s states were defined geographically by European cartographers at the start of the colonial period. The modern African state system has been gradually Africanized, albeit on more or less the identical territorial basis it began with at the time of decolonization in the second half of the 20 th century. Less than 20% of Africa’s states achieved statehood following rebellion or armed insurgency in the others, independence flowed from peaceful transfers of authority from colonial officials to African political elites. The initial constitutions and legal systems were derived from the terminal colonial era.

Cold War geopolitics reinforced in some ways the state-society gap as the global rivalry tended to favor African incumbents and frequently assured they would receive significant assistance from external powers seeking to build diplomatic ties with the new states. This situation supported an external orientation in African politics in which Cold War reference points and former colonial relationships assured that African governments often developed only a limited sense of connection to their own societies. The African state system has gradually developed a stronger indigenous quality only in the last twenty-five years or so. Africa’s states are the world’s newest, and it can hardly be surprising that Africans define themselves in terms of multiple identities including regional, tribal, clan-based, and religious ones—in addition to being citizens of a relatively new state.

For these and other reasons, the state-society gap lies at the heart of the problems faced by many states. Governments that rely on foreign counterparts and foreign investment in natural resources for a major portion of their budgets—rather than on domestic taxation—are likely to have weaker connections to citizens and domestic social groups. This adds to the challenge of building national identities this ‘identity vacuum’ increases the risk that political elites and social groups will capture the state for narrower, self-interested purposes that weaken, rather than strengthen, social cohesion.

Conflict Trends and the Governance Link

African conflict trends point to a complex picture, made more so by the differing methodologies used by different research groups. It seems clear that Africa’s conflict burden declined steadily after the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s owing to successful peace processes outstripping the outbreak of new conflicts but the burden has been spiking up again since then. One influential research group, SIPRI in Sweden, counted a total of 9 active armed conflicts in 2017 (in all of Africa) plus another 7 post-conflict and potential conflict situations. 3

More revealing is the granular comparison of conflict types over time. Thus, another report by PRIO and the University of Uppsala (two Norwegian and Swedish centers) breaks conflict down into state-based (where at least one party is a government), non-state-based (neither party is an official state actor), and one-sided conflicts (an armed faction against unarmed civilians). This study points to a marked increase in state-based conflicts, owing in significant part to the inter-mixture of Islamic State factions into pre-existing conflicts. This study notes that in 2007 Africa saw 12 conflicts in 10 countries. Ten years later, in 2017, the number of conflicts was 18, taking place in 13 different countries. Using a second conflict lens, the number of non-state conflicts has increased dramatically in recent years, peaking in 2017 with 50 non-state conflicts, compared to 24 in 2011. These events point to extreme state fragility and a loss of sovereign control over violence in the 11 affected countries, led by Nigeria, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR). One-sided violence against unarmed civilians has also spiked up since 2011. 4

These numbers require three major points of clarification. First, many of the conflicts enumerated take place within a limited number of conflict-affected countries and in clearly-defined geographic zones (the Sahel and Nigeria Central Africa and the Horn.) Second, the levels of direct ‘battle deaths’ from these events is relatively low when compared with far higher levels in the wars of the Middle East. Some of these conflicts are, in reality, low-tech, sporadic skirmishes and armed attacks. Third, Africa’s conflict burden reflects different forms and sources of violence that sometimes become linked to each other: political movements may gain financing and coercive support from criminal networks and traffickers, while religious militants with connections to terrorist groups are often adept at making common cause with local grievance activists. Large states and those with complex ethnic and geographic features—e.g., the DRC, Nigeria, Uganda, the Sudans, Ethiopia—may be especially prone to such multi-sourced violence. Indeed, it should be added that a high percentage of today’s conflicts are recurrences of previous ones, often in slightly modified form with parties that may organize under more than one flag. One scholar specializing on the Horn of Africa likens the situation a ‘political marketplace’ in which politics and violence are simply options along the spectrum pursued by powerful actors. 5

This brief overview of conflict in Africa signals the severity of the security challenges to African governance, especially in those sub-regions that feature persistent and recurrent outbreaks of violence. Recent developments add further complications to the region: (a) the collapse of Libya after 2011, spreading large quantities of arms and trained fighters across the broader Sahel region (b) the gradual toll of desertification placing severe pressure on traditional herder/farmer relationships in places like Sudan and Nigeria and, (c) the proliferation of local IS or Al Qaeda franchises in remote, under-governed spaces. Not surprisingly, incumbent leaders facing these challenges look to short-term military remedies and extend a welcome to military partners—with France, the United States, and the United Nations the leading candidates.

The link between conflict and governance is a two-way street. Security challenges can impose tough choices on governments that may act in ways that compound the problem, opening the door to heightened risks of corruption and the slippery slope of working with criminal entities. On the other hand, weak or destructive governance is sometimes the source of conflicts in the first place. This can happen in several ways. In the thankfully rare cases where national governance breaks down completely—South Sudan, Somalia, CAR—its absence is an invitation to every ethnic or geographic community to fend for itself—a classic security dilemma.

A second conflict pattern can develop along the lines of ethnic cleavages which can be readily politicized and then militarized into outright ethnic violence. The challenge facing Africa’s leaders—perhaps above all others—is how to govern under conditions of ethnic diversity. Admittedly, the problem is by no means uniquely African, but it is very commonly experienced in Africa.

When conflicts evolve along ethnic lines, they are readily labelled ‘ethnic conflict’ as if ‘caused’ by ancient hatreds in reality, it is more often caused by bad governance and by political entrepreneurs. Poor leadership can result in acts of commission or omission that alienate or disenfranchise geographically distinct communities.

A third pattern flows from the authoritarian reflex where ‘big men’ operate arbitrary political machines, often behind a thin democratic veneer. Typically, such leaders scheme to rig elections or to change constitutional term limits—actions seen in recent years in such countries as Rwanda and Uganda. Despite the adoption of constitutional term limits in many African countries during the 1990s, such restrictions have been reversed or defied in at least 15 countries since 2000, according to a recent report. 6

The conflict-governance link takes various forms, and it points to the centrality of the variable of leadership. In ‘new’ countries such as most of those in Africa, 7 where the rule of law is in competition with the rule of men, leaders play a strikingly critical role, for good or ill. Wise leadership respects ethnic diversity and works toward inclusive policies. This theme, which is further developed below, is especially critical bearing in mind that Africa is the world’s most ethnically complex region, home to 20 of the world’s most diverse countries in terms of ethnic composition. 8

Governance Trends and Scenarios

African governance trends were transformed by the geopolitical changes that came with the end of the Cold War. Almost at a stroke, the relationships between African governments and the major powers and major sources of concessional finance were upended, while political liberalization in the former Soviet bloc helped to trigger global political shock waves. Space opened up for African citizens and civil society movements, while incumbent regimes were no longer able to rely on assured support from erstwhile external partners. These partners, for their part, sometimes disengaged from close political ties and often brought new governance conditions into their assistance programs. Freedom House calculated that 17 out of 50 countries it covered were ‘free’ or ‘partly free’ in 1988, compared to 31 out of 54 countries in these categories by 2015. Of the latter, 10 achieved the top rating of ‘free,’ a conclusion close to ratings by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). 9 A more bullish reading drawn again from multiple sources is that over 60% of people in sub-Saharan Africa live in ‘free’ or ‘partly free’ countries, a situation that enabled a Brookings Institution study to conclude that “the region [is] moving in fits and starts towards greater democratic consolidation.” 10 Countries absent from the apparent democratic wave missed its beginnings in the early and mid-1990s, became caught up in protracted or recurrent civil conflicts, or degenerated as a result of electoral violence or ‘big men’ patrimonialism.

Against this broad picture, what is striking is the more recent downward trend in democratic governance in Africa and the relative position of African governance when viewed on a global basis. Freedom House’s ratings see a pattern of decline since 2005 and note that 10 out of 25 countries (worldwide) with declining ratings are in Africa. The same source concluded that 7 out of the 12 worst scores for political rights and civil liberties are African. 11 As noted, the reasons vary: patrimonialism gone wrong (the ‘big man’ problem), extreme state fragility and endemic conflict risks, the perverse mobilization of ethnicity by weak or threatened leaders.

The long-term, global pushback by the leading authoritarian powers against liberal governance norms has consequences in Africa and other regions as governments directly act to ‘close the space’ for civil society to operate. These dynamics often lead to increased state fragility or the ‘re-authoritarianization’ of once more participatory governance systems. 12 The trend is sometimes, ironically, promoted by western firms and governments more interested in commercial access and ‘getting along’ with existing governments than with durable political and economic development. African states, along with Asian, Middle Eastern, and even European governments, have all been affected. The campaign by some (but not all) African states to pull out of the International Criminal Court is but one illustration of the trend. The swing against western norms was captured in an interview with Uganda’s repeatedly re-elected president Yoweri Museveni who remarked “How can you have structural adjustment without electricity? … The Chinese understand the basics. …You can’t impose middle class values on a pre-industrial society.” 13

This outline leads us to examine more closely the sources of legitimacy in African governance systems. One can identify five bases of regime legitimacy in the African context today. The first type is rights-based legitimacy deriving from rule of law, periodic elections, and alternation of political power, the kind generally supported by western and some African governments such as Ghana and Senegal. In direct contrast is the second model: statist, performance-based legitimacy, measured typically in terms of economic growth and domestic stability as well as government-provided services—the legitimacy claimed by leaders in Uganda and Rwanda, among others. Leaders may not be the only ones who support this definition of legitimacy.

A third, less often recognized base of legitimacy can be called ‘conventional African diplomatic legitimacy’ wherein a government—however imperfectly established—is no more imperfect than the standard established by its regional neighbors. Regional governance comes into play here, and certain precedents may get set and then ratified by regional or sub-regional organizations. For example, the election day itself goes more or less peacefully, the vote tabulation process is opaque or obscure, and the entire process is shaped by a pre-election playing field skewed decisively in favor of the incumbents. Sometimes, another precedent flows from these—namely, pressure from outside the country but with some support internally as well for creating a transitional government of national unity. Such post-electoral pacts reflect the conclusion that stability is more important than democracy.

Still another form of legitimacy in Africa sometimes derives from traditional political systems based on some form of kingship. Long-standing kingdoms such as those in Morocco and Swaziland are recognized national states. More frequently, this form of rule operates at the sub-state level as in the case of the emir of Kano or the Sultan of Sokoto in Nigeria or the former royal establishments of the Baganda (Uganda) or the Ashanti (Ghana). Ousted royals such as Haile Selassie (Ethiopia) and King Idriss (Libya) may be replaced by self-anointed secular rulers who behave as if they were kings until they, in turn, get overthrown. But established and recognized forms of inherited rule cannot be lightly dismissed as ‘un-modern,’ especially when linked to the identity of an ethnic or tribal group, and could be construed as a building block of legitimacy.

It may be useful to recall that historical kingships or dynasties were the common form of rule in Europe, India, China until modern times, and still is the predominant form of rule on the Arabian Peninsula. Legitimacy based on successful predation and state capture was well known to the Plantagenets and Tudors as well as the Hapsburgs, Medicis, and Romanovs, to say nothing of the Mughal descendants of Genghis Khan. 14 In this fifth model of imagined legitimacy, some African leaders operate essentially on patrimonial principles that Vladimir Putin can easily recognize (the Dos Santos era in Angola, the DRC under Mobutu and Kabila, the Eyadema, Bongo, Biya, and Obiang regimes in Togo, Gabon, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea, respectively). 15 Such regimes may seek to perpetuate themselves by positioning wives or sons to inherit power. Rule that is based on predation and political monopoly is unlikely to enjoy genuine popular legitimacy, but it can linger for decades unless there are effective countervailing institutions and power centers.

Against this backdrop, where is African governance headed? The key lies in identifying the variables that will shape its context. These include macro variables such as educational access (especially for women), climate change impact and mitigation, development and income growth rates, demographic trends, internet access, urbanization rates, and conflict events. Beyond such macro factors, several less obvious variables seem important to the political and economic governance future of the region. One of these is the potential influence exerted by the region’s leading states, measured in terms of size, population, economic weight, and overall political clout and leadership prestige. If a critical mass of the leaders—e.g., South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Cote d’Ivoire, Algeria, Egypt—are heading in a positive direction, they will pull some others along in their wake of course, the reverse is also true.

One snapshot by the influential Mo Ibrahim index of African Governance noted in 2015 that ‘overall governance progress in Africa is stalling,’ and decided not to award a leadership award that year. (No award was made in 50% of the years since the program was launched in 2007 former Liberian president Ellen John Sirleaf won the award in 2017. Interestingly, small and mid-size state leaders have won the award so far.) The point here is that peer pressure, examples, and precedents are especially important in a region of 54 states, many of them dependent on satisfactory relations with their neighbors. Due to the influence of previous South African and Nigerian leaders, the African Union established the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to review and report on a range of governance criteria. By 2016, 35 AU members had ‘joined’ it, but less than half actually subjected themselves to being assessed. African states are by no means homogeneous in terms of governance standards: as the Mo Ibrahim index based on 14 governance categories reported in 2015, some 70 points on a scale of 100 separated the best and worst performers. 16

Stated another way, if the abolition of term limits, neo-patrimonialism, and official kleptocracy become a regionally accepted norm, this will make it harder for the better governed states to resist the authoritarian trend. If more leaders practice inclusive politics or find themselves chastened by the power of civil society to do so, this could point the way to better political outcomes in the region. While this seems obvious, it is less clear what vectors and drivers will have the most weight in shaping that outcome.

Other Critical Governance Drivers

One of these will be the role and weight of various powerful external actors. African political elites are more determined than ever to shape their own destiny, and they are doing so. But the context in which their choices are made is directly influenced by global political trends and the room for maneuver that these give to individual governments and their leaders. The rise of non-Western centers of power and the return of global polarization among major powers reduce the presence and weight of western influence. This provides wide opportunity for governments to experiment, to chart a course independent of Western preferences, but it can also encourage them to move toward authoritarian, state capitalist policies when that is the necessary or the expedient thing to do. Africa’s geopolitical environment is shaped by Africans to a considerable degree. But it also reflects the impact of Arab, Russian, Chinese, Indian, European and U.S. vectors of influence which project their differences into African societies. If African political elite opinion converges with that of major external voices in favoring stabilization over liberal peacebuilding agendas, the implications for governance are fairly clear. 17

Another driver of governance trends will be the access enjoyed by youthful and rapidly urbanizing populations to the technologies that are changing the global communications space. Relatively unfettered access to the internet via smart phones and laptops brings information—and hence potential power—to individuals and groups about all kinds of things: e.g., market prices, the views of relatives in the diaspora, conditions in the country next door, and the self-enrichment of corrupt officials. Issues of corruption and transparency are likely to become driving themes in African politics. The balance of power between official and non-official actors will likely shift, as networked activists assert their ability to organize and take to the streets on behalf of diverse causes. Overturning regimes in Africa’s often fragile states could become easier to do, without necessarily leading to better governance. The same technology vectors can also empower criminal, trafficking, and terrorist networks, all of which pose threats to state sovereignty. In sum, the digitization of African politics raises real challenges for political leaders and has the potential to increase their determination to digitize their own tools of political control.

The Sources of Resilient Governance

This brief essay began by identifying the state-society gap as the central challenge for African governance. In these relatively new nations, the critical task for leadership is to build a social contract that is sufficiently inclusive to permit the management of diversity. To illustrate, when there are 2.2 billion Africans, 50% of whom live in cities, how will those cities (and surrounding countryside) be governed? What policies and laws will determine relations between farmers and urban dwellers, between farmers and herders, between diverse identity groups living in close proximity or encroaching on each other’s farm land, and between public officials, criminal networks and ordinary citizens? The optimistic reply—and it is a powerful one—is that Africans will gradually build inclusive political and economic institutions. 18 This, however, requires wise leadership.

Political leaders everywhere face competing demands in this regard. On the one hand, they recognize the need for strong, responsive state institutions weak, fragile states do not lead to good governance. Yet political stability cannot be based on state power alone, except in the short run. Political and economic inclusion is the companion requirement for effective and legitimate governance. The question then becomes, how to be inclusive? 19 A number of African states have decentralized their political decision-making systems and moved to share or delegate authority from the center to provincial or local levels. The jury is still out on the merits of this practice. The cases of Nigeria, Kenya, and South Sudan suggest that each case must be assessed on its own merits. At times, devolution has had major fiscal and governance consequences, including serving as a vehicle for co-option and corruption. Large countries such as the DRC, Ethiopia, and Mozambique are likely to experience pressures against centralized, authoritarian, or one-party governance (whether accompanied by real elections or not).

Another basic question is, whom to include? Non-official institutions and civil society may have very different ideas from the national government on this issue, leading to debates about legitimacy. Yet, governments are expected to govern and make decisions after consulting relevant stakeholders. Ideally, African nations will benefit when civil society respects the state’s role (as well as the other way around) rather than one-sided advocacy, both sides should strive to create a space for debate in order to legitimize tolerance of multiple views in society.

The imperative for inclusion raises many questions: should the priority be to achieve inclusion of diverse elites, of ethnic and confessional constituencies, of a sample of grass roots opinion leaders? Should inclusion be an ongoing process or a single event? For example, is it more effective to negotiate a power-sharing pact among key parties and social groups (as in Kenya) or is there possible merit in a periodic ‘national dialogue’ to address issues that risk triggering conflict? Building an inclusive political system also raises the question of what levels of the society to include and how to assure that local communities as well as groups operating at the national level can get their voices heard.

In some societies, traditional, tribal authorities may offer informed and genuinely accepted governance, provided that they are not merely government appointees pursuing decentralized self-enrichment. Legal norms are an integral part of the discussion about inclusivity since they affect every aspect of economic and personal life this poses a critical question over whether individual rights or group rights take precedence in the normative hierarchy. There is also the question of inclusion of specific demographic cohorts: women, youth, and migrants from rural to urban areas (including migrant women) all face issues of exclusion that can have an impact on conflict and governance. Misguided policies at the national level combined with cultural constraints facing these social groups may increase exclusion and create seeds of future trouble.

In light of this discussion of types of inclusion, the implications for dealing with state fragility and building greater resilience can now be spelled out. Some regimes seem resilient because of their apparent staying power but actually have a narrow base of (typically ethnic or regional) support. The regime in this case captures the state, co-opts the security organs, and dissolves civil society. When a seemingly brittle regime reaches the end of its life, it becomes clear that the state-society gap is really a regime-society gap the state withers and its institutions become hollow shells that serve mainly to extract rents.

The problems that face African governments are universal. But African societies are exposed to especially severe pressures, and governments must operate in an environment of high social demands and limited resources and capacity with which to meet them. These circumstances can generate an authoritarian reflex and the temptation to circle the wagons against all sources of potential opposition. The result is transitory resilience of the regime, but shaky political stability, declining cohesion, and eventual conflict or violent change.

The most promising pattern is adaptive resilience in which leaders facing such pressures create safety valves or outlets for managing social unrest. Some African leaders such as Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, or Mozambique’s Joachim Chissano accept and respect term limits and stand down. A more recent example of adaptive resilience is being demonstrated by Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed. His dramatic tenure since April of 2018 appears to be shaking up the state’s creaky authoritarian services and creating the space for important adaptations such as ending a long-standing state of emergency, freeing political prisoners, reaching out to a wide range of foreign partners, and extending the olive branch to Eritrea with whom Ethiopia had fought a costly war. The quality and durability of such leader-defined adaptive resilience cannot be assured and can be reversed unless the associated norms become institutionalized.

A long-term route to political and economic success has been comprehensively documented by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in their global study of why nations fail or succeed. In this view, nations fail because of ‘extractive economic and political institutions’ that do not provide incentives for growth and stability. They succeed when there are political conditions that permit a broad coalition to impose ‘pluralist political institutions’ and ‘limits and restraints’ on ruling elites. 20 Thus, resilience of both state and society may hinge in the end on the rule of law replacing the rule of men. This we might call transformative resilience. 21

The development of inclusive institutions may involve struggles that enable political and societal actors to check the domination of entrenched rulers and to broaden rule-based participation in governance. For Acemoglu and Robinson, such turning points occur in specific, unique historical circumstances that arise in a society’s development.

An Interim Conclusion

It is too soon to tell whether such institutions can evolve in modern Africa as a result of gradual tinkering with reformist agendas, as the legacy of wise leaders or whether they will only happen as a result of fundamental tests of strength between social and political groups. We know a good deal about what Africans want and demand from their governments from public opinion surveys by Afrobarometer. There is strong demand for jobs, better economic management, reduced inequality and corruption and such outcome deliverables as health, education and infrastructure. 22 Those outcomes require effective governance institutions. We do not yet know whether such institutions will consistently emerge, starting with relatively well-governed states, such as Ghana or Senegal, as a result of repeated, successful alternations of power or whether they will only occur when Africa’s political systems burst apart and are reconfigured. If inclusion is the central ingredient, it will be necessary to explore in greater depth the resources leaders have available to ‘pay’ for including various social groups and demographic cohorts. Even old-fashioned tyrants learn that inclusion or co-option are expensive. Enlightened leaders face a more complex version of the same challenge: how to find and mobilize the resources for broad-based inclusiveness? This point links the reader to the other Africa chapters that have been prepared for this project.

Chester A. Crocker is the James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies at Georgetown University. He served as assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989.


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